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"The [Social Security] tax is the neglected stepchild of tax policy
analysis."
I. INTRODUCTION
When politicians, or even the average guy on the street, debate whether
the allocation of the federal tax burden is "fair" and "efficient," they
typically do so by talking only about the federal income tax burden. For
example, columnist Jerry Heaster, correctly reporting that the top one
percent of income earners in 1999 paid about thirty-six percent of "all
federal personal income taxes," writes, "How much tax do high income
Americans need to pay before the class warriors will be satisfied?"
2
But the fact of the matter is that about as much federal revenue is
collected from the payroll taxes (Social Security and Medicare) as from the
personal income tax,3 and the payroll taxes are extremely regressive,
significantly diluting the percentage of the total federal tax burden paid by
the wealthy. For example, in a year 2000 study, the staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation estimated that, under the law at that time, those
earning more than $200,000 would pay 42.7% of the total federal personal
income tax collected, while the top 1% would pay 33.6%. 4 If, however, all
federal taxes are measured, including the regressive Social Security and
Medicare taxes, the shares plummet to 27.5% for those earning more than
$200,000 and 18.6% for the top 1%.5 These reductions will become even
more dramatic after the full phase-in of the 2001 tax cuts for the super
I Patricia E. Dilley, Breaking the Glass Slipper-Reflections on the Self-Employment
Tax, 54 TAX LAW. 65, 65 (2000) [hereinafter Dilley, Glass Slipper].
2 Jerry Heaster, Tax Burden Weighs on Wealthy, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 17, 2002,
at G3.
3 See Andrew Mitrusi & James Poterba, The Distribution of Payroll and Income Tax
Burdens, 1979-1999, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 765, 765 (2000) [hereinafter Mitrusi & Poterba,
Distribution].
4 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DISTRIBUTION OF CERTAIN FEDERAL TAX
LIABILITIES BY INCOME CLASS FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2000,2 (2000) [hereinafter JOINT TAX
COMMITTEE]. As noted in the text, it turned out to be about 36% for the top 1%, presumably
because of the exuberant stock market and unusually high capital gain realizations, most of
which were realized by the top 1%. "Almost three-quarters of American capital-gains
income comes from just 1.7 percent of taxpayers." Gene R. Nichol, Law's Disengaged Left,
50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 547, 551 (2000).
5 JOINT TAX COMMITTEE, supra note 4, at 3.
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wealthy.
6
While the tax debate centers on the federal income tax burden,
provocative empirical studies published by economists Andrew Mitrusi and
James Poterba in 2000 show that nearly two-thirds of American households
now pay more in federal payroll taxes than income taxes, 7 chiefly because
of significant increases in the payroll tax burden over the last twenty years.
This results in much higher effective tax rates, as well as a higher. total tax
burden, for the lower and middle classes than is probably widely
appreciated. Further, it results in a higher portion of the federal tax burden
being borne by labor income (as opposed to capital income, which is
concentrated in the wealthier households) than is probably widely
appreciated. In other words, there is a huge elephant in the room that few
politicians talk about and even fewer citizens recognize.
This article explores the historical reasons why we have three separate
taxes on labor income at the federal level-the income tax, the Social
Security tax, and the Medicare tax-and considers how and why the
government might integrate the tax burdens on labor income in some way
today. 8 For ease of discussion, this article will refer to the "double tax" on
6 See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. The story does not end at the federal
level, though. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities released a study that shows that
during the 1990s many states significantly decreased the percentage of revenue collected
through the progressive income taxes and significantly increased the percentage collected
through regressive sales taxes. See Nicholas Johnson & Daniel Tenny, The Rising
Regressivity of State Taxes, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, at
http://www.cbpp.org/l-15-02sfp.pdf (Jan. 15, 2002). As a result, the current percentage
share of state tax liability relative to the late 1980s has decreased for the wealthy while it has
increased for the poor and middle classes.
7 See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
8 The issue of whether the Social Security system ought to be abolished and replaced
entirely with private savings is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that if the
Social Security system is abolished and replaced with private retirement accounts individual
to each worker, this article becomes (obviously) moot. This article attempts to explore the
tax burden on labor income if the Social Security and Medicare taxes remain in place.
The short version of my take on privatization, however, can perhaps be gleaned from
what I have to say in the rest of this article. The privatizers generally dislike the
redistributive nature of the payment system under Social Security. As described later, see
infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text, a much higher percentage of wages is replaced
for low-wage workers than for high-wage workers. A strict system of privatized accounts,
with no matching payments for low-wage workers or other system modifications, would end
the redistribution from higher-wage workers to lower-wage workers that is embedded in the
current system. It would also shift market risk to the participant. Many middle- and upper-
income workers have private retirement savings subject to market risk as a balance to the
"guaranteed" nature of the social security benefit, while lower-wage workers have only
social security. At this point, it seems to me that both shifts would be unwise policy choices.
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labor income, which consists of the income tax on labor income and the two
payroll taxes on labor income lumped together.
9
The case for integration rests more on equitable grounds than on
grounds of economic efficiency. In one sense, the efficiency argument is a
function of the extent of the disincentive effect that a double tax on labor
income has on work effort. Because of the $84,900 wage ceiling that caps
the Social Security tax base,' 0 and the low rate for the Medicare tax that
continues to apply above that ceiling, there is likely no disincentive effect at
the margin for wage earners or self-employed individuals earning more than
$84,900. Indeed, the income effect l1 might predominate for workers
earning slightly below the wage ceiling, who might work longer and harder
to exceed the margin and begin taking home more after-tax income for
dollars earned above the ceiling.
The case is certainly more complicated for those earning significantly
less than the wage ceiling, but there might not be as large a disincentive
effect as might be imagined for several reasons. The obvious reason is that,
to the extent the worker has control over hours worked, we do not know
whether the income effect predominates over the substitution effect or vice-
versa. Moreover, lower- and middle-class taxpayers might have far less
control than the upper-class taxpayers over the extent of work effort. For
example, the worker might not have the freedom to choose to work only
While there might be creative ways to craft a privatized system that maintains both security
and redistribution in some fashion, we also have to be concerned about the administrative
costs of shifting to private accounts as well as the price effects of vastly increased capital
infusions into the capital markets that would accompany private accounts invested in the
private stock and bond markets. Nevertheless, I think we have only begun to earnestly
explore alternatives. In the meantime, however, I think no one can dispute the success of
Social Security at dramatically reducing poverty in the elderly population. See MICHAEL J.
GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY 115-19 (1999). Moreover, its success as a
mechanism that helps to stabilize the economy by stabilizing consumption in retirement also
should not be undervalued.
9 Some people might consider nonsensical the characterization of the payroll taxes as
imposing a "double tax" on labor income (in addition to the income tax), since the taxes are
all going to the federal Treasury. For these people, there is only a "single" federal tax on
labor income, albeit collected through several different mechanisms that result in combined
effective and marginal rates that are higher than commonly understood. Focusing on
whether it is a "double tax" masks the essential issue of whether these rates are "too high"
under either a fairness or efficiency inquiry. I do not believe that the substance of the
critique changes much, if at all, under these two different ways of framing the issue.
10 See Tom Herman, Tax Report: A Special Summary and Forecast of Federal and
State Tax Developments, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2002, at Al; see also discussion infra Part II.
I I Some workers, facing a high marginal tax rate on the last dollar, might choose not to
earn that dollar and substitute untaxed leisure (the substitution effect), while others will be
encouraged to work even harder to reach certain after-tax income goals (the income effect).
[Vol. 22:1
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thirty-five hours per week instead of forty hours if the employer rigidly
defines the worker's job to require forty hours. In short, it might not be
possible to disentangle the myriad incentives that affect work effort and
isolate the incentive effects of the payroll taxes in particular.
Another factor might be the worker's perception, whether accurate or
not, regarding the "rate of return" that she receives in retirement on her
"insurance contribution." The disincentive effect on work effort should be
weakened if the worker believes that the return is reasonable. While low-
wage workers have historically obtained a high "return" on their "insurance
contributions," 12 Kotlikoff and Sachs argue that low-wage workers tend not
to appreciate this, because some low-wage workers, such as domestic
workers, have striven to avoid imposition of the tax (and the subsequent
enjoyment of the return) through a failure to report self-employment
income. 13 This tendency, however, might be due simply to a pattern of
high "discount rates" among low-wage workers. That is to say, low-wage
workers might require an unreasonably high rate of return before they are
willing to defer consumption to the future. 14
In any event, to the extent that payroll taxes do discourage work at the
margins for low- and middle-class taxpayers and thus raise efficiency
concerns, or encourage the underreporting of wages, integrating the payroll
and income tax burdens could help to ameliorate these effects.
The more persuasive argument for integrating the payroll tax burden on
labor income with the income tax burden on labor income is simple equity.
The combined tax burden on labor income from the payroll and income
taxes on the poor and middle classes has increased dramatically in the last
two decades, and the increase in tax burden is clearly due to substantial
increases in the Social Security and Medicare tax rates as well as the Social
Security wage base during that time. 15 In other words, there has been a
dramatic increase at the federal level on the taxation of labor income,
particularly for the middle class. Moreover, this period also witnessed a
decreasing reliance on the corporate tax, one of the biggest sources of
12 See infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
13 See DANIEL SHAVIRO, MAKING SENSE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 31-32 (2000) (discussing
research by Kotlikoff and Sachs to this effect).
14 See, e.g., Jonathan Clements, "I Plan to Save Like Crazy-Someday," WALL ST. J.,
June 26, 2001, at Cl; Mary Kane, Behavioral Economists Can't Say Why We Spend, CLEV.
PLAIN DEALER, May 21, 2001, at 4-C. Both articles discuss how people generally tend to
overvalue the present compared to the future, what Harvard's David Laibson termed
"hyperbolic discounting." Id. I would expect that discount rates may be even higher among
the poor and lower-middle classes, as compared to the upper classes, if we assume the
decreasing marginal utility of money as income and wealth rise.
15 See discussion infra Part III.
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capital taxation. 16 Michael Graetz argued:
If the basic principle of tax justice requiring taxes to be distributed
in accordance with ability to pay is to be satisfied, a significant
portion of the tax burden must be borne either by wealth (or
wealth transfers) or income from capital. Taxes on labor income
alone-even if, unlike [Social Security] taxes, they were
progressively structured-do not produce taxation based upon
ability to pay, for those with the greatest ability to pay often have
channeled their monies into capital. 17
One can defensibly argue that this state of affairs is simply unjust,
particularly at a time when the tax burdens of the super wealthy are being
significantly reduced through repeal of the estate tax 18 and reduction in the
top income tax rates9-all in a period of unprecedented wealth
concentration in this country. In considering whether the distribution of the
tax burden is "fair" by examining the extent to which it is "progressive," the
right inquiry might not be whether the percentage of tax collected across
income strata is progressive but rather how taxes affect the distribution of
after-tax discretionary income and wealth. If this is right, information on
16 "Simultaneously with this great tax increase on labor income, we have experienced
an almost equally striking decline in taxes on capital, most dramatically in the portion of
federal revenues generated by the corporate income tax." Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled
Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax Policies, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 862-63 (1987)
[hereinafter Graetz, Troubled Marriage].
In contrast to the enormous growth in taxes on wages, the percentage of total
revenues generated by the corporate income tax has declined sharply in the past
forty years. The corporate income tax produced more than 30 percent of federal
revenues in 1953, but now produces only about 12.5 percent.
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 21 (1997) [hereinafter
GRAETZ, DECLINE].
Writing nearly two decades ago, Richard Kaplan noted that "the increasing
significance of social security taxes exacerbates the federal tax system's bias against
earnings from labor-wages, salaries, and self-employment profits ..... " Richard L.
Kaplan, The Shifting Burden of Federal Taxes, 19 TAx NOTES 3, 4 (1983). The material in
Part III, infra, describes more fully recent research documenting this increase.
17 Graetz, Troubled Marriage, supra note 16, at 863-64.
18 The estate tax is extremely progressive. See generally Deborah A. Geier, The Death
of the "Death Tax"?: An Introduction, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 653, 654 (2001).
19 See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
20 Cf. Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the
Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAx REV. 1 (1998) (arguing both that the
progressivity of the tax burden ought to be measured and distributed by reference to growth
in after-tax incomes and that economic efficiency is not necessarily harmed thereby).
[Vol. 22:1
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income and wealth concentration is crucial to the inquiry, and "wealth in
America is more highly concentrated today than at any time since
1929 .... 21 The wealthiest 1% of households has more than doubled its
ownership of private assets in this country since 1976. Whereas the top 1%
owned about 19% of our country's assets in 1976, it now owns nearly
40%.22
Examining Federal Reserve data, Edward N. Wolff found that between
1983 and 1998-a period that coincides with substantial increases in the
payroll tax burdens on the labor income of the poor and middle classes-
the trend in wealth concentration accelerated. As reported by Tom
Redburn:
The number of households with a net worth of more than $1
million nearly doubled, to 4.78 million from 2.41 million. At the
same time, the ranks of the truly rich exploded even more, with
those worth more than $10 million nearly quadrupling, to 239,000
from about 67,000.
That's great. A rich society like the United States should have
plenty of rich people-and the more the merrier. But what is
disturbing is what happened to just about everybody else.
"The richest 1 percent accumulated 53 percent of the total gain
in marketable wealth over the 1983-1998 period," Mr. Wolff
wrote. "The next 19 percent received another 39 percent, so that
the top quintile accounted for 91 percent of the total growth in
wealth, while the bottom 80 percent accounted for a mere 9
percent."
"The results indicate rather dramatically," he added, "that the
fruits from economic growth in the last few decades were enjoyed
by a surprisingly small part of the population-the top 20 percent,
and particularly the richest 1 percent."
' 23
Though most agree that extreme wealth concentration can lead to
plutocracy and can damage democratic values, there can never be universal
agreement on the proper criterion for arriving at what constitutes the "most"
equitable distribution of the tax burden across the members of the
population. Nor will there ever be universal agreement regarding the
proper balance between equity, however defined, and economic efficiency
21 David Cay Johnston, More Get Rich and Pay Less in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,
2002, at A22.
22 Nichol, supra note 4, at 550-51.
23 Tom Redburn, Honoring, and Paying All Those Who Serve, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28,
2001, § 3, at 4.
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and growth, or even the "best" tax policy approach to support growth.
For example, a tax system premised on the classic utilitarian theory of
minimal aggregate sacrifice would result in taxing only Bill Gates until his
income was brought down to the next highest income earner, taxing those
two until their incomes were brought level with the third, etc., until the
requisite amount of revenue was raised. Yet, such an approach to "equity"
concerns-involving exclusive taxation of the rich at confiscatory rates-
completely ignores other criteria of fairness, such as just dessert, and also
completely ignores the effects of such a tax system on economic efficiency
24and investment. At the other extreme, an equal sacrifice or head tax
might free up huge amounts of capital for investment by slashing taxes on
the wealthy but completely ignores the intuitive notion of the decreasing
marginal utility of money (sticking with classic utilitarian theory for the
sake of comparison).
There is also no simple agreement within the realm of economics itself
regarding how best to promote growth, as exemplified by the disagreement
between supply-side and demand-side economists regarding the role of
savings in economic growth. As summarized by John F. Witte:
According to Keyne's analysis of the depression, excess
savings do not necessarily lead to growth; rather, they stifle
consumption, which is the engine that stimulates economic
activity. The policy argument that follows from this analysis is
that one should reduce taxes, but reduce them for the poor and
middle class, who consume the most. Supply-side theorists stress
the need for investment and an increase in savings to fuel
corporate expansion. The corresponding policy recommendation
is again to cut taxes, but in this case the taxes of upper-income
groups that have a higher propensity to save and greater capital to
invest.
25
In short, those who believe that the tax burden ought to favor capital
substantially may not see any need to explore how the income tax and
payroll tax burden on labor income might be integrated. But for those
troubled by the increasing percentage of the tax burden borne by labor
income (as opposed to capital income) and by the increasing magnitude of
wealth and income concentration, this article shall press on with its
exploration.
The most straightforward way to integrate would be to repeal the
24 See JOHN F. WIrTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
32-36 (1985) [hereinafter JOHN F. WITrE].
25 Id. at 47.
[Vol. 22:1
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payroll taxes (the Social Security tax and Medicare tax) and raise the
revenue formerly raised via those taxes through the income tax. After all,
"Social Security is just a part of a larger tax-transfer system that matters
solely insofar as it affects people."26 A combined system could make these
allocative and distributional choices much more transparent, even if the
decisions are to keep the relative allocations and distributions the same.
Having several, separate taxes at the federal level on labor income masks
the combined effective tax rate and tax burden imposed on labor income.
Nevertheless, there are sound reasons for maintaining the payroll taxes
as separate taxes. Just as when they were adopted, the separate taxes might
be perceived by the average taxpayer as the equivalent of "insurance
premiums," with the benefits received in retirement as merely the receipt of
insurance benefits previously purchased. While, as later described, this is
an absolutely inaccurate description of the Social Security and Medicare
systems, the common perception can lead to political support for the old-
age and survivor's benefit and Medicare benefits, which are generally
redistributive in a way that many consider good as a matter of public
policy. 27 In other words, some might argue that there are sound public
policy reasons to nurture what amounts to an inaccurate view of the Social
Security system in order to protect it-a "benign propaganda" of sorts. The
insurance analogy that leads to widespread political support could be lost if
the separate payroll taxes were repealed and the programs funded with
general revenue from the individual and corporate income taxes.
28
Short of repealing the payroll taxes entirely, full or partial integration
26 SHAVIRO, supra note 13, at 147.
27 "Social Security is meant to be redistributive .... ".Lee Cohen et al., Social
Security Redistribution by Education, Race, and Income: How Much and Why, at
http://www.bc.edu/bc-orgavp/cso mexecutive/crrf/paperslThirdCohen-Steuerle-Carasso-
Paper.pdf at 1 (May 17-18, 2001) [hereinafter Lee Cohen et al.]; see also infra notes 113-17
and accompanying text.
28 Moreover, earmarked taxes for social welfare and healthcare spending can reduce
the risk of fiscal bankruptcy.
With general fund financing, each budgetary item is supported ultimately by the
revenues of the whole budget; however, this creates an incentive for
overexpansion and waste. With the earmarking arrangement, in contrast, the
deep pocket of the whole budget is not available; therefore, the incentive for
overexpansion and waste is effectively curtailed. Consequently, the risk of fiscal
bankruptcy is greatly reduced. For measures such as national health insurance
and social welfare policies that involve substantial fiscal outlays, the potential
risk of having runaway growth is acute. In short, the compartmentalization
consideration makes the earmarking arrangement not only theoretically
straightforward but practically relevant.
Bingyuang Hsiung, A Note on Earmarked Taxes, 29 PUB. FIN. REv. 223, 227-28 (2001).
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might consist of an income tax deduction for the employee portion of the
Social Security and Medicare taxes. Alternatively, payroll taxes could be
made creditable against income tax liability, with a gross-up in the
compensation inclusion if the employer-paid portion were also made
creditable by the employee. Since I assume, however, that revenue
constraints would not likely allow crediting even the entire employee
portion of such taxes, I also assume that any plausible proposal would be
limited to either deducting or crediting a portion of the employee portion.
That issue is what this article addresses.
It makes little sense to allow a deduction (or a credit) for a tax within
the same tax. That is to say, it makes little sense for the federal income tax
to be deducted for purposes of computing how much federal income tax is
owed. As Senator Henry F. Hollis said when a deduction for federal taxes
was repealed in 1917, "It is a pure matter of expediency. If you so arrange
the income tax this year that you allow those who pay it to take back a third
of it next year, you have simply got to put on a bigger tax ...." 29 It would
make the tax system more complicated with no fundamental shift in the tax
burden.
But the matter is not so clear-cut when considering whether a flat wage
tax of approximately fifteen percent on wages up to, but not exceeding,
approximately $85,000 with no deductions or credits30 ought to be
deductible or creditable under an income tax on both wages and capital with
no ceiling and progressive rates up to approximately thirty-five percent.
Absent massive changes in the structure of the income tax itself, either a
deduction or a refundable credit for a portion of the payroll tax should make
the tax burden more progressive and less oppressive on the labor income of
lower- and middle-income taxpayers. If the argument for integration of the
payroll and income tax burdens is to rest on equity grounds, however, the
spending side must also be considered. That is to say, welfare might not
actually be increased for low- and middle-wage workers if they suffer
disproportionately any spending cuts that may accompany the integration.
For this reason, this article might be more than a year too late.
Substantial budget surpluses were forecasted prior to the enactment of the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (2001 Act).
3 1
Once our elected representatives decided to decrease tax collections
significantly to decrease this surplus, they had to decide which form the tax
reductions should take. Integrating the payroll and income taxes in a
29 65 CONG. REC. 6324 (1917).
30 See discussion infra Part II.
31 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
115 Stat. 38 (2001).
[Vol. 22:1
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manner considered in this article would have resulted in the allocation of
much more of the tax cut to the lower and middle classes than occurred
with the decision to repeal the estate tax and decrease the marginal income
tax rates on the highest income earners without a concomitant reduction in
social spending. Absent a rollback of those tax decreases, which seems
unlikely, the revenue lost with any integration proposal would have to be
matched with spending cuts today, since no budget surpluses are
foreseeable in the near future. 32 If the spending cuts of $X that were
needed to pay for the lost revenue of $X that integration would produce
were aimed disproportionately at the poor and middle classes, then no net
change in utility for those classes would result. Indeed, they might be
worse off if they were deprived of necessary services that they could not
obtain in the marketplace for a price equal to (or less than) their tax savings.
For that reason, this article explores one other possibility that does not
involve explicitly integrating the tax burdens of the income and payroll
taxes on labor income but might nevertheless address the equity concerns
inherent in the high combined tax rates on such income for the lower and
middle classes. That remedy is to repeal the wage ceiling on the imposition
of the Social Security tax, which would allow drastically slashing the
relatively high marginal rates that we now have under that tax, while
maintaining such a ceiling in the payment formula 33 in order to protect the
redistributive function. The rate reduction could be calibrated to be revenue
neutral and thus would not require spending cuts. Eliminating the wage
ceiling on the Social Security tax, while maintaining a ceiling under the
payment formula, might be perceived as unfair if the tax is thought to be the
equivalent of a private pension contribution. The arguments developed in
this article, however, which build on seminal work done by Patricia Dilley,
show why such a perception of the Social Security system is fundamentally
misguided. Viewed as a general tax that supports the infrastructure of a
capitalist economy by maintaining consumption spending by the retired,
etc., there is no reason why the tax should not be structured in a progressive
fashion, as is the income tax itself. With a flat-rate tax, the only way to
make it progressive (and to lower the single, flat marginal rate) is to expand
the wage base upward.
Part II briefly sets out the double tax on labor income that arises under
the income, Social Security, and Medicare taxes and even more briefly
describes the current income tax treatments of the latter two taxes as well as
the benefits received under the Social Security and Medicare programs.
32 See, e.g., Deficits are Foreseen For at Least 3 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at
Al.
33 See discussion infra Parts I-III.
20021
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Part 111 provides information on the history of relative income tax and
payroll tax burdens in order to place the issue in historical perspective. Part
IV explores the history of the separate payroll tax itself. Part V confronts
arguments that the combined Social Security and Medicare payroll tax is
not a double tax (in addition to the income tax) at all because it purchases
individual future benefits that, on average, exceed the tax payments made.
The issue of whether we ought to link the payroll tax paid to future benefits
received on an individual basis is a critical aspect of analyzing how they
ought to be treated under an income tax. I reject that linkage. Even though
I reject that linkage, Part VI nevertheless explores how payroll taxes as well
as cash benefits and medical care received under Social Security and
Medicare might be treated under the income tax if we accept that linkage as
a legitimate one. Part VII discusses these issues from the more persuasive
view that severs the tax from possible future benefits. At bottom, it argues
that a portion of the employee payroll taxes, both Social Security and
Medicare, ought to be creditable, dollar for dollar, against any income tax
liability, with a refundability feature capped by reference to a reasonable
"personal exemption" amount. Cash Social Security payments received, if
any, ought then to be fully includable in gross income under the income tax
when received, though the value of medical care received under the
Medicare program ought to remain excludable.
34
34 One final observation before proceeding is worthwhile. As might be gleaned from
the brief description above, this article will analyze the possibilities for integration by
reference-in part at least-to income tax theory in the old-fashioned sense of the term. It
considers, for example, whether the payment of a tax ought to be deductible or creditable
under traditional notions of what the tax base ought to be if what we seek to tax is "income,"
as conventionally defined or as actually implemented in our hybrid income/consumption tax
system. I am fully aware that this kind of analysis has fallen on hard times in legal
academia. This methodology has been labeled the "internal coherency approach" and uses
such criteria as coherency, consistency, and clarity of the tax law. See Joseph Bankman, The
Business Purpose Doctrine and the Sociology of Tax, 54 SMU L. REV. 149, 155 (2001).
Under the "efficiency/welfarist" approach, in contrast, "the value of coherency, consistency,
and clarity is entirely instrumental." See id. (quoting Mark P. Gergen, The Common
Knowledge of Tax Abuse, 54 SMU L. REV. 131, 144 (2000)). The inquiry under the
efficiency/welfarist approach is only whether the deduction or credit makes sense on
efficiency grounds (in the sense of neoclassical economics) or advances social welfare,
"understood as some aggregate of well-being of individuals in society" (in the sense of
welfare economics). Louis Kaplow, A Framework for Assessing Estate and Gift Taxation, in
RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION 203 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001). While
there may be overlap, tax policy analysis is nevertheless distinctly different under these two
approaches, no matter what the tax policy topic.
Bankman notes that those who champion the internal consistency approach "are
skeptical . . . about the normative assumption that underlies the welfarist/efficiency
approach: that efficiency is all that matters," while "[t]he efficiency/welfarist approach
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regards internal coherency-based scholarship as without normative force. Internal coherency
scholarship can tell the welfarist something about the consequences of a particular provision,
but until those consequences are tethered to an efficiency/welfare analysis, internal
coherency scholarship cannot say anything about the desirability of that provision."
Bankman, supra, at 156. Bankman goes on to observe that, in his opinion, "the
efficiency/welfarist group is somewhat in the lead" and that "[t]hose who cannot at least
participate in the discourse of efficiency and welfare run the risk of being marginalized." Id.
at 157.
I think that Bankman is certainly correct in his appraisal of which kind of scholarship
seems to be more valued in today's law-and-economics world. Moreover, this fact is
relevant, I believe, to the topic of this article, as there is arguably a relationship between this
fact and the shift toward the kinds of more regressive taxation that is exemplified by the shift
toward heavier taxation of labor income and lighter taxation of capital income. Fairness
arguments have steadily lost ground to the more "scientifically" based arguments grounded
in economics, where economic growth (which is often argued arises from freeing capital
from taxation), rather than a fair allocation of the costs of government across the population,
is the paramount concern. See generally RONALD F. KING, MONEY, TIME, & POuTICS:
INVESTMENT TAX SUBSIDIES & AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1993) (detailing the shift in
acceptable tax policy rhetoric from fairness to economic growth after World War II); M.
Susan Murnane, Selling Scientific Taxation (2001) (unpublished paper, on file with author).
In commenting on the rise in empirical economic research in tax policy, John F. Witte stated,
"[N]umbers tend to drive out non-numbers in the policy-making process," JOHN F. WITTE,
supra note 23, at 47-48. This approach, therefore, can result in two dangers:
What is alarming is that the uncertainty of the estimates and the qualifications
that are a part of scholarly discourse may be lost as unqualified users zero in on
simple aggregate conclusions to build and support political arguments. The other
danger of this research is that the emphasis in the empirical studies is on
efficiency losses, and the equity side of the equation can be easily lost. This is
bound to weight the outcome in favor of less progressivity ....
Id. at 48 (footnote omitted).
Those firmly in the efficiency/welfarist camp will no doubt see this article as lacking
any normative force, since it chiefly elaborates the ways in which one can view the payment
of payroll taxes, and the receipt of government benefits, from within the paradigm of a tax
on "income" or "consumption." In this sense, it is descriptive, seeking the internal
consistency that is the hallmark of the unfashionable internal coherency approach, but this
description is rooted in what I see as fairness, in the sense of the fair distribution of the
aggregate tax burden. One means by which we have sought to honor that virtue in the past is
by allocating the tax burden across the members of the population by reference to
individuals' "ability to pay," which I believe is a powerful (if imprecise) norm. The ability-
to-pay value has traditionally been thought to justify use of "income" as the tax base (as
opposed to, say, consumption). See generally J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. et al., Fairness in
International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX
REV. 299 (2001) (situating the ability-to-pay norm within income taxation theory in the
context of taxing foreign-source income and citing the relevant authority discussing the
ability-to-pay value at the margins). Analyzing how a payroll tax ought to be treated under
income tax theory can be seen, therefore, not merely as an empty tautological exercise but
rather as a proxy in the pursuit of equity, ultimately grounded in the ability-to-pay fairness
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II. INCOME AND PAYROLL TAXES ON LABOR INCOME
American taxpayers are generally subject to three federal taxes
imposed on wages and self-employment income, as opposed to capital
income. The earliest of these taxes was the so-called income tax, which is
today actually a hybrid income/consumption tax, first enacted in 1913 after
adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 35  Though
commentators bemoan the difficulties of fully taxing income from capital
under our current income tax,36 the tax is (at least nominally) imposed on
income both from labor and from capital.37 Indeed, one of the fundamental
impetuses underlying the move toward income taxation was a desire to tax
income from the capital of the wealthy. This income essentially escaped
taxation under the various consumption taxes, such as imposts and tariffs,
norm.
Of course, the welfare economists would respond that social welfare, not fairness,
ought to govern this analysis, but I leave that analysis to them. But, from what I can see, the
outcome under a "fairness" approach might well mirror the outcome under a "welfarist"
approach in most cases.
Moreover, I believe that an analysis that seeks internal consistency within the current
tax system can have persuasiveness in the political system. I am, after all, ultimately seeking
a response in that system. Indeed, perhaps I ought, for that reason, to abandon the internal
consistency approach and consider a public choice analysis of payroll and income tax
integration, but I also leave that analysis to others.
35 Actually, there was a short-lived income tax during the Civil War, and the income
tax enacted in 1894 was ruled unconstitutional in 1895 as an unapportioned "direct tax."
The adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment permitted an income tax without regard to
apportionment. See generally JOHN F. WiTrE, supra note 24, at 67-75.
36 See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Colloquium on Financial Instruments: Risk-Based Rules
and the Taxation of Capital Income, 50 TAX L. REV. 643, 645 (1995) (positing that "a zero
tax rate [as opposed to a negative tax rate] on capital income is often the best that can be
done...").
37 At the individual level, income from capital is more lightly taxed than labor income
due to the ability to defer taxation of most capital income by choosing when to realize it, by
taxing capital gains at lower rates than ordinary income, and by completely forgiving built-in
gain at death because of the step-up in property basis at death under current section 1014.
Because the incidence of the separate corporate tax might fall on all individual holders of
capital, however, the corporate tax might, in a rough way, equalize the tax burden on labor
and capital in the income tax. In other words, integration of the corporate and individual tax
might exacerbate the overtaxation of labor income relative to capital income in the income
tax, while integrating the payroll tax burden with the income tax might tend toward better
equalizing the tax burden across labor and capital. Cf. David Cay Johnston, 2 Courts Reject
I.R.S. Efforts to Limit Tax Shelters, N.Y. TiMES, June 22, 2001, at Al (noting that "Treasury
Secretary, Paul H. O'Neill, called last month for the elimination of corporate income taxes,
an idea that he said intrigued President Bush").
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which funded the operations of the federal government prior to 1913.38 The
debates surrounding the concept of income taxation clearly evidenced the
policymakers' intention to achieve greater fairness in the allocation of the
tax burden. They show a common understanding that prior modes of
taxation were consumption taxes that were regressive in nature and that an
income tax would more fairly apportion the tax burden to those with greater
wealth.
39
In view of this early desire to use income taxation to effectuate a more
progressive allocation of the tax burden, the income tax, though of earliest
application, did not apply to a great many taxpayers 40 until the advent of
World War I, when it was forever "transformed from class tax to mass
tax." 41 The early desire to use the tax to reach chiefly the capital income of
the wealthy was attenuated by the need for larger revenues to fund the war
effort and post-war government policies, though the rate structure of the
income tax remained highly progressive in this era. While middle-class
taxpayers were subject to the tax on a massive scale for the first time, the
marginal rates applicable to these taxpayers were significantly lower than
the ninety-percent plus rates applicable to the highest income earners.
The two so-called payroll taxes discussed here are imposed on labor
income only, and they were introduced at different points in time. The first
was the Social Security tax, enacted in 193542 and substantially broadened
in 193943 (and many times thereafter) as part of President Roosevelt's New
38 See generally JOHN F. WITTE, supra note 24, at 77 (noting that Congressman Hull
"forcefully defended the [proposed income tax] as based not on consumption, as the tariff
and excise taxes were, but on ability to pay").
39 See generally Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the
Meaning of "Incomes", 33 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1057 (2001) (recounting the debates surrounding
the enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment, focusing in particular on the move from
consumption taxation to income taxation to shift more of the tax burden to the wealthy).
40 Fewer than two percent of workers filed income tax returns between 1913 and 1915.
See JOHN F. WITTE, supra note 24, at 78.
41 Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion
of the Income Tax During World War 11, 37 BuFF. L. REv. 685, 687(1989).
42 See Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
43 See Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, 53 Stat. 1360
(1939). Robert M. Ball, who began working in the Social Security administration in 1939
and was its Commissioner from 1962-1973, has written, "Even before monthly annuities
were payable to a wage earner under the original Act, the program was completely
revamped. In a very real sense, the 1939 Act more than the old-age benefit provisions of
1935 formed the Social Security structure that we know today." Robert M. Ball, The 1939
Amendments to the Social Security Act and What Followed, in THE REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY OF 1935, at 161, 162 (50th anniversary ed. 1985)
[hereinafter 1935 REPORT]. Among other changes, the 1939 amendments broadened the
beneficiary class from the worker to the worker's family, including spouse, children, and
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Deal. For employees, the tax base for this tax is "wages," and an equivalent
self-employment tax is imposed on self-employed individuals. For 2002,
the Social Security tax is imposed on the first $84,900 of wages or self-
employment income,44 with no personal exemptions, deductions, or zero-
bracket amount of any sort, unlike in the income tax. The ceiling increases
each year according to the increase in average wages in the U.S. economy.
even parents. See John J. Corson, The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Program, in WAR
AND POST-WAR SOCIAL SECURITY 58, 59-61 (Wilbur J. Cohen ed., 1942). But the
precipitating issue that caused Congress to revisit the program so soon was a controversy
over the financing mechanism. The recession of 1937 provoked fears that "the original
method of financing the old-age benefit system-by accumulating a large reserve account-
might serve as a drag on future economic growth." Alan Pifer & Forrest Chisman,
Foreword to 1935 REPORT, supra, at xi. Ball described the controversy, which has
resonance for today's discussions about the funding of Social Security, as follows:
What seemed most important at the time was a continuing battle between
those who favored a substantial build-up of reserves that would earn interest and
later reduce the level of needed contributions, and those who favored raising only
the amount of money needed to pay current benefits-the so-called "pay-as-you-
go" approach.
The controversy over financing came to a head when Senator Vandenberg of
Michigan questioned Social Security Board Chairman Arthur J. Altmeyer at a
Senate Finance Committee hearing on February 22, 1937. Senator Vandenburg
felt that the accumulation of funds, estimated to reach $47 billion, had serious
consequences for sound fiscal policy. Investing them in government securities as
provided by the law would require a permanent national debt which he and many
others considered undesirable. Yet if the Social Security funds were invested in
non-federal securities there would have been new federal involvement in private
economic activity. Perhaps the most important criticism was that the reserves
would encourage extravagant federal spending, because Social Security would
have created a ready source for federal borrowing. From the opposite viewpoint,
an earnings reserve was considered a way to avoid an eventual general revenue
contribution, and on this ground had the personal support of President Roosevelt.
Ball, 1935 REPORT, supra, at 163-64.
Congress did modify the law so that, "in place of a large reserve account for old-age
benefits, the adoption of a 'pay as you go system' with a partial reserve meant each
generation would finance its parents' retirement out of current earnings." Pifer & Chisman,
supra, at xi.
When looked at together, the 1935 and 1939 Social Security Acts essentially put
in place all the basic features of the Social Security retirement and survivors'
insurance programs as they exist today: entitlement based on earnings reflecting a
long term attachment to the paid work force; pay-as-you-go financing; and a
benefit formula weighted in favor of low income workers.
Patricia E. Dilley, Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of Social Security
Privatization, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 975, 1031 (2000) [hereinafter Dilley, Rhetoric].
44 See Herman, supra note 10.
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Wages or self-employment income earned above the ceiling amount are
free from these taxes. Therefore, Bill Gates pays the same in Social
Security tax as a college professor earning $84,900 per year in wages. The
employee must pay tax at a rate of 6.2% on this tax base,45 while the
employer pays an additional 6.2% 46 (summing up to 12.4%), though
economists generally agree that the incidence of the employer portion of the
tax falls mostly on the employee in the long run through wages that are
depressed by an equivalent amount.47  The self-employed pay the entire
12.4% directly.
48
The Medicare tax, also imposed on a tax base of wages (or self-
employment income), was enacted in 1966. 49 The Medicare tax, unlike the
Social Security tax, is now imposed on all wages and self-employment
income, without limit, and is imposed at a combined employer and
employee rate of 2.9% (1.45% on each).50 Once again, the self-employed
pay the entire 2.9% directly.51 Thus, wages and self-employment income
up to $84,900 (as of 2002) are taxed at a total combined flat rate of 15.3%,
45 I.R.C. § 3101(a).
46 I.R.C. § 3111(a).
47 See, e.g., JOSEPH PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAx POLICY 232-33 (5th ed. 1987) ("In the
long run, most of the payroll taxes are probably paid by the worker; it makes no difference
whether the law imposes the tax on the employee or on the employer."); Andrew Mitrusi &
James Poterba, The Changing Importance of Income and Payroll Taxes on U.S. Families, 15
TAx POL'Y & ECON. 95, 98 (2001) ("We assume that workers ultimately bear the employer
share of the payroll tax in the form of lower wages.") [hereinafter Mitrusi & Poterba,
Changing Importance]; SHAVIRO, supra note 13, at 10 ("Economists generally agree that the
distinction in who pays which portion of the payroll tax has no effect on economic
incidence, and that at least in the short run the entire tax is largely borne by workers .... ");
C. Eugene Steuerle & Jon M. Bakija, Basic Features of the Social Security System, 62 TAx
NOTES 1457, 1457 (1994 ) (noting that "[m]ost economists agree that practically all of the
burden of the 'employer' portion of the Social Security tax fails on the worker, who
effectively pays through reduced wages").
48 I.R.C. § 1401(a). See generally Dilley, Glass Slipper, supra note 1 (describing both
the conceptual and administrative difficulties pertaining to the self-employment tax base,
which seeks to replicate the wage tax base within the income tax system).
Also introduced in the Social Security Act of 1935 was the Unemployment Tax, which
today is imposed on every employer at the rate of 6.2% of the first $7,000 of wages of each
employee and which funds the joint Federal-State unemployment compensation program.
I.R.C. §§ 3301, 3306(b). There is no explicit employee tax. Employers can credit up to
90% of eligible contributions made to state unemployment funds against the federal tax.
I.R.C. § 3302. Unemployment payments are includable in gross income. I.R.C. § 85. The
unemployment tax and payments are not further discussed in this article.
49 Tax Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-368, 80 Stat. 38 (1966).
50 I.R.C. §§ 3 101(b), 3111(b).
51 I.R.C. § 1401(b).
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with no exemptions or deductions, while wages and self-employment
income above that ceiling continue to be taxed at a flat rate of 2.9%.
None of the payroll and self-employment taxes are creditable against
the tax due under the income tax, and none of them are formally deductible
by employees under the income tax. Because the incidence of the employer
portion of these payroll taxes likely falls on the wage-earner, however, the
employee gets an effective deduction for these taxes, as though payment of
the taxes were included in the employee's gross income as additional
wages, and then the employer portion of the tax were deducted by the
employee. Thus, it is more accurate to say that, in substance, the employee
is effectively allowed to deduct one-half of the 15.3% aggregate payroll tax
economically borne by him but not the other half. To achieve parity, the
self-employed are expressly allowed to deduct one-half of their self-
employment taxes under section 164 of the Internal Revenue Code
(Code).
52
Although money is fungible, and thus tracing government outlays from
any particular tax stream is conceptually problematic, the Social Security
and Medicare taxes are commonly perceived to be the source of funds for
several kinds of government benefits. 53 The biggest and most well-known
is the old-age and survivors benefit, payable to those in retirement who
have worked at least forty quarters (three-month periods) in the paid labor
force (unless exempted from the system5 4), as well as their surviving
spouses. Joint federal-state programs dealing with disability payments are
also funded by these payroll taxes.
Under the complex rules in section 86, a certain portion of old-age and
survivors benefits is taxed under the income tax when received. Daniel
Shaviro explains the rules as follows:
Under a maddeningly complex set of rules, Social Security
benefits are excluded for income tax purposes by individuals with
modified adjusted gross incomes below $25,000 ($32,000 for
married couples). Above that point, the benefits are 50 percent
includable, and the resulting income tax revenues officially
attributed to the Social Security Trust Fund. The inclusion
52 See I.R.C. § 164(f).
53 See Dilley, Glass Slipper, supra note 1, at 65 n.2 (describing these benefits and
providing the various pinpoint citations in the Social Security Act).
54 For example, as an employee of a state university with its own retirement system, I
am ineligible to participate in Social Security and do not have the 12.4% payroll tax
withheld from my paycheck, though Medicare tax is still withheld. See generally Ball, in
1935 REPORT, supra note 43, at 169 (stating that some state and local government employees
remain outside the Social Security system).
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percentage rises to 85 percent for individuals with modified
adjusted gross incomes above $34,000 ($44,000 for married
couples), with the extra revenues from the increase in inclusion
percentage being officially attributed to Medicare.
55
In 1999, about 45.7 million people received old-age and survivors benefits,
while 9.6 million individual income tax returns reported taxable benefits, a
record high.56  Disability payments are treated the same as old-age and
survivors benefits. 57  The value of free medical care received in kind
pursuant to the Medicare program is not taxed under the income tax.
III. PAYROLL TAXES IN CONTEXT OVER TIME
As of 1999, nearly two-thirds of families pay more in payroll taxes
than they do in income taxes, while fewer than one-quarter of families pay
more in income taxes than they do in payroll taxes.5 8 By comparison, in
1979, only forty-four percent of families paid more in payroll taxes than
income taxes.59 Moreover, the families that pay more in payroll taxes than
in income taxes are overwhelmingly low- and middle-income families.
Mitrusi and Poterba showed that an overwhelming majority of families with
adjusted gross incomes of $100,000 or less in 1999 paid more in payroll
taxes than in income taxes; however, very few families with adjusted gross
incomes of more than $100,000 paid more in payroll taxes than income
taxes. Mean income taxes do not reach approximate parity with mean
payroll taxes until one reaches $75,000 to $100,000 of adjusted gross
income (AGI), increased by certain items of untaxed income (adjusted
AGI).60  "At income levels below $50,000, more than three-quarters of
55 SHAVIRO, supra note 13, at 17.
56 See Tom Herman, Tax Report: A Special Summary and Forecast of Federal and
State Tax Developments, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2001, at Al.
57 See Thomas v. Comm'r, T.C.M. (CCH) 1653 (2001). Disability payments are not
further discussed in this article.
58 "In aggregate, 23.7% of families have personal income tax liabilities in excess of
their payroll taxes, 62% have payroll taxes in excess of personal income taxes, and 14.3%
have equal liabilities (usually zero)." Mitrusi & Poterba, Distribution, supra note 3, at 771
tbl.2 notes; see also Mitrusi & Poterba, Changing Importance, supra note 47, at 101
("Payroll taxes exceed income taxes for 62 percent of all families, and for 73 percent of
those with either income or payroll tax liability.").
59 Mitrusi & Poterba, Distribution, supra note 3, passim.
60 "Adjusted AGI" is adjusted gross income plus the following items: employer-paid
Social Security and Medicare taxes, the portion of Social Security benefits received that is
excluded from gross income under section 86, interest received on state and local bonds that
is excluded under section 103, and deductible contributions made to individual retirement
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families have payroll tax bills that exceed their income taxes. At adjusted
AGI levels above $200,000, income taxes exceed payroll taxes for virtually
all families."
6 1
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME & PAYROLL TAXES
BY FAMILY ADJUSTED AGI, 199962
Mean % of % of
1999 Family Families Mean payroll Families Families
Adjusted (millions) Personal Tax, with with
AGI (000s) Income Tax Employer Combined Employee
(dollars) & Employee Payroll Tax Payroll Tax
Payments > Personal > Personal
Income Tax Income Tax
All Families
<10 28.83 -262* 400 46.4 46.2
10-20 23.65 -239* 1,475 71.6 58.3
20-30 18.11 1,062 2,833 81.7 43.2
30-40 13.26 2,519 4,199 85.7 34.9
40-50 10.57 3,942 5,405 74.5 27.9
50-75 18.92 6,248 7,170 66.3 19.1
75-100 9.93 10,629 9,950 55.0 6.3
100-200 9.30 20,755 12,570 16.2 1.5
200-500 2.03 64,481 14,394 0.1 0.1
500-1000 0.36 182,264 17,873 0.0 0.0
> 1000 0.18 799,100 28,848 0.0 0.0
All 135.15 841 603 62.1 34.6
All Families With Tax Liability
<10 13.70 -551* 842 97.6 97.5
10-20 19.16 -285* 1,821 87.9 71.4
20-30 17.25 1,118 2,975 85.5 45.1
30-40 13.05 2,562 4,267 86.9 35.2
40-50 10.52 3,962 5,432 74.9 28.0
50-75 18.85 6,272 7,197 66.5 19.2
75-100 9.92 10,636 9,957 55.1 6.3
100-200 9.29 20,775 12,583 16.2 1.5
200-500 2.03 64,503 14,399 0.1 0.1
500-1000 0.36 182,345 17,880 0.0 0.0
accounts and so-called Keogh plans. See id. at 770.
61 Id. at 771.
62 This table is taken from Mitrusi & Poterba, Changing Importance, supra note 47, at
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I >1000 I 0.18 798,446 28,853 I 0.0 0.0
All 114.31 7,350 5,270 73.2 40.8
* The negative income tax is due to the impact of the earned income tax credit.
These conclusions are only marginally less dramatic if solely the
employee share of payroll taxes is taken into account. As noted earlier,
most economists assume that the incidence of the employer share of Social
Security taxes falls on the employee. Nevertheless, the last column in the
table above breaks out the percentage of families for whom the employee
share of payroll taxes exceeds the personal income tax.
Not surprisingly, excluding half of each family's payroll tax
burden substantially reduces the likelihood that payroll taxes
exceed personal income taxes. However, employee payroll taxes
still exceed personal income taxes for 35 percent of all families,
and for more than 40 percent of all families that pay taxes.
Families in the lowest income ranges, with adjusted annual AGI of
less than $20,000, have a greater than 50-percent chance of paying
more in employee payroll taxes than in personal income taxes.
Conditional on paying any taxes at all, these families' chances of
paying more in employee payroll taxes than in personal income
taxes are greater than four in five.
63
Mitrusi and Poterba also illustrated the increasing burden of payroll
taxes relative to income taxes between 1979 and 1999, and this increase in
burden was most dramatic for middle-income taxpayers with adjusted AGIs
of between $30,000 and $100,000. For example, the table below shows
that, in 1979, 45.8% of families with adjusted AGIs of between $30,000
and $40,000 paid more in payroll taxes than in income taxes, but that
percentage nearly doubled to 85.7% by 1999. Even more dramatic was the
increase from 4.6% to 55% for families with adjusted AGIs of between
$75,000 and $100,000. Moreover, the increases are even more pronounced
if the sample is limited to only families that actually paid taxes. The table
shows that for families with 1999 adjusted AGIs between $10,000 and
$20,000, for example, 71.2% of all families but 87.5% percent of families
with positive tax liabilities had 1999 payroll taxes in excess of personal
income taxes. Mitrusi and Poterba also showed that these effects were
particularly dramatic for two-earner married couples, where the cap on
taxable earnings can result in a greater aggregate payroll tax liability for a
given level of family earnings.
64
63 Id. at 101.
64 See id. at 108-09.
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PERCENT OF FAMILIES WITH PAYROLL TAx IN EXCESS OF PERSONAL
INCOME TAX
65
All Families
<10 46.4 46.3 46.4 46.4 46.4
10-20 71.2 70.8 71.3 71.5 71.6
20-30 66.7 78.8 81.1 81.5 81.7
30-40 45.8 58.8 84.5 85.3 85.7
40-50 37.5 48.0 68.9 73.5 74.5
50-75 19.1 28.8 63.4 65.5 66.3
75-100 4.6 7.3 41.3 49.1 55.0
100-200 1.0 1.5 9.7 13.4 16.2
200-500 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1
500-1000 0.2 0.3 0 0 0
>1000 0.4 0.5 0 0 0
All 41.8 47.0 59.5 61.1 62.1
Families with Positive Personal Income Tax or Payroll Tax
<10 97.7 97.4 97.6 97.6 97.6
10-20 87.5 87.2 87.6 87.8 87.9
20-30 70.0 82.7 85.0 85.4 85.5
30-40 46.4 59.7 85.8 86.5 86.9
40-50 37.7 48.2 69.2 73.8 74.9
50-75 19.1 28.9 63.7 65.8 66.5
75-100 4.6 7.3 41.3 49.2 55.1
100-200 1.0 1.5 9.7 13.5 16.2
200-500 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1
500-1000 0.2 0.3 0 0 0
>1000 0.4 0.5 0 0 0
All 49.4 55.6 70.2 72.2 73.2
What to make of these observations? If the allocation of total revenue
receipts between income and payroll taxes had remained relatively constant
in this period, these numbers actually might be quite positive. Under such
an assumption, they could possibly demonstrate that the income tax burdens
of low- and middle-income families have been substantially shifted to the
upper classes during this period, which would mean that relatively constant
65 This table is taken from id. at 105.
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payroll tax payments could then exceed income tax payments for more
members of this class. It is true that the income tax reaches fewer low-
income families today than in the past, due mainly to the enactment and
expansion of the earned income tax credit.66  When the relative
contributions of payroll taxes and income taxes to total national revenue are
considered, however, it becomes apparent that these numbers are due in
large part to substantial increases in the payroll tax rates as well as
substantial increases in the Social Security wage base in the last two
decades. Payroll taxes have funded an increasingly larger share of total
federal tax revenue since the early 1980s. Even though the taxes are
imposed at a flat rate, the wage ceiling feature of the tax base means that it
is both regressive (with the average tax rate falling as wages increase) and
concentrated in the poor and middle classes. The significant increases in
the payroll tax rates and the wage base since the early 1980s explain why
these taxes have become an increasingly larger share of the total tax burden
for those families with less than $100,000 of income. "Until 1963, federal
receipts from the individual income tax were more than twice as great as
federal payroll tax revenues. In 1995, payroll tax receipts were
approximately equal to income tax receipts." 67  This observation is
confirmed by data showing that, when income and payroll taxes are
combined, most upper-income taxpayers realized an aggregate tax decrease
between 1979 and 1999, while low-income taxpayers generally experienced
a tax increase.
If we restrict the analysis to families that paid either payroll or
income taxes . . . .the data show that 70.2 percent of families
faced lower income taxes in 1999, but that only 37.5 percent faced
lower income and payroll taxes. At low family income levels,
most families experienced a tax increase between 1979 and 1999.
We need to focus on families in income strata above $50,000
before the probability of paying lower combined taxes in 1999
than in 1979 rises above 50 percent. [These results] provide a
stark demonstration of the importance of combining income and
payroll taxes when considering recent changes in tax burdens.
68
These numbers will become even more pungent when phase-in of the 2001
Act is complete.
69
66 See infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
67 Mitrusi & Poterba, Distribution, supra note 3, at 765.
68 Id. at 778-79.
69 It also should be noted that this reduction in progressivity at the federal level has
occurred at the same time that reductions in progressivity have occurred at the state level.
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I have been unable to find data comparable to that of Mitrusi and
Poterba for the early years of the payroll taxes. Nevertheless, it is fair to
say that the increasing tax burden on labor income of the lower and middle
classes (from the combination of payroll and income taxes on labor income)
evident from 1979 to 1999 is a relatively new phenomenon. Consider two
other emblematic tax years: 1939 and 1960. 70 In 1939, the payroll tax was
established but the income tax had not yet become a mass tax. In 1960, the
income tax had itself become a mass tax, imposed on the lower classes in
addition to payroll taxes. Moreover, that year is only seventeen years
before the beginning of the twenty-year period examined by Mitrusi and
Poterba.
In 1939 (and, indeed, through 1949), the combined employer and
employee Social Security tax was two percent (one percent each), which
was imposed on wages up to $3,000.71 Because of the generous personal
exemptions under the income tax-$2,500 for married couples and $1,000
for single taxpayers, along with $400 for each dependent,72 at a time when
few households earned as much each year-the two-percent payroll tax was
the only tax paid by the vast majority of lower- and middle-class workers.
Even during the "high tax" years of World War I, "at most 13 percent of the
labor force [paid] income taxes."73 When tax collections decreased in the
1920s after the end of the war, Yale economist T.S. Adams wrote that the
income tax "touches directly perhaps only 5 or 6 percent of the
population."74  By 1939, only about five percent of the population paid
income taxes.
75
By 1960, the income tax was entrenched as a mass tax, with
approximately seventy-three percent of the population covered by taxable
returns.76 The personal exemptions had been reduced to $600 for a single
See supra note 6.
70 The Statistics of Income Service at the Internal Revenue Service does have a small
statistical sample on computer tape for 1960, but it does not contain any data on Social
Security taxes. And, of course, there are no computer files for 1939. E-mail from Peter
Sailer, Statistics of Income Service, Internal Revenue Service, to Deborah A. Geier,
Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University (July 10,
2001) (on file with author).
71 See PECHMAN, supra note 47, at 332 tbl.A-1 1.
72 See LAWRENCE A. SELTZER, THE PERSONAL EXEMPTIONS IN THE INCOME TAX 40, 52
tbl.7 (1968).
73 JOHN F. WITTE, supra note 24, at 125.
74 Thomas S. Adams, How Federal Taxes Are Made, 15 NAT'L TAX ASS'N PROC. 331,
337 (1923) (quoted in James A. Wooten, The "Original Intent" of the Federal Tax
Treatment of Private Pension Plans, 85 TAX NOTES 1305, 1315 (1999)).
75 See SELTZER, supra note 72, at 62 tbl.9.
76 See id.
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individual and $1,200 for a married couple in 1948, and they remained
unchanged by 1960 in spite of the reduced economic value of those
amounts with inflation. But the income tax rates applicable to the lower
classes were still relatively low, so that those with adjusted gross incomes
of less than $5,000-when the average annual salary in the early 1960s was
$4,70077-- contributed just 8.8% of aggregate individual income tax
revenue in 1965. 78 Moreover, while the payroll tax wage base increased to
$4,800-almost precisely the average annual salary-and the combined
Social Security tax rate increased to six percent (three percent each for the
employer and employee), 79 the payroll tax, which did not yet include the
Medicare tax, was still low compared to modem standards. Therefore, it is
fair to say that the combined tax rate on the labor income of the poor and
middle classes was still low by comparison to today. The bulk of federal
revenue was collected from the upper classes, and the balance between
taxation of labor income and taxation of capital income was not nearly as
skewed toward labor income as today.
This brief review suggests that one means by which we could decrease
the tax burden on the labor income of the lower and middle classes to
restore a balance closer to historical standards (without explicit integration
of the two taxes) would be to repeal the wage ceiling under the Social
Security tax. The Social Security tax would then apply to an unlimited
amount of wages, like the Medicare tax. Elimination of the wage ceiling
would allow a slashing of the Social Security tax marginal rate. In other
words, eliminating the wage ceiling could pay for substantial rate cuts
(perhaps closer to the three-percent rates of 1960) in a revenue-neutral
fashion. Such lower marginal rates should also reduce any behavioral
distortions, and thus sacrifices in economic efficiency, that accompany the
relatively high Social Security tax rates of today.
80
IV. DOUBLE TAX BY ACCIDENT?
It was not inevitable that Social Security benefits would be funded
from a separately collected and ear-marked payroll tax on wages. The
Social Security program created in 1935 could have been funded with
general tax revenues collected from the individual and corporate income
77 See Bob Herbert, Get Well, George, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2001, at A23.
78 See SELTZER, supra note 72, at 74 tbl.15 (the sum of .7%, 1.6%, and 6.5% for AGI
of $1,000 to $2,000; $2,000 to $3,000; and $3,000 to $5,000; respectively), 73 chart 6. I do
not have this precise information for 1960, but I have no reason to believe that it differed
significantly from 1965.
79 PECHMAN, supra note 47, at 332 tbl.A-11.
80 See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
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taxes (as well as tariffs and other federal excise taxes). Indeed, some
influential members of President Roosevelt's Commission on Economic
Security, which drafted the Social Security proposal, advocated such an
approach. Wilbur J. Cohen accompanied University of Wisconsin
Professor Edwin E. Witte to Washington when Professor Witte, who
"virtually single-handedly wrote the entire wide-ranging committee
report,"'8 1 was appointed to head the effort. Cohen later recalled that
"[d]uring the formation of the committee's proposal, Emergency Relief
Administrator [Harry] Hopkins favored some kind of broad,
comprehensive, unified program that would involve, exclusively or
substantially, federal general revenues. Other proposals along this line
were pending in Congress and were supported by some social workers and
members of Congress."
82
Unless the Congress expanded the income tax to reach the middle and
lower classes, however, using general income tax revenues to fund Social
Security benefits would have meant that the wealthy would essentially pay
for the program. In 1935, the wages of most workers were not taxed under
the income tax because of the high personal exemptions. Conservatives,
who "charged that the social security conception violated the traditional
American assumptions of self-help, self-denial, and individual
responsibility,"' 83 would not likely have supported such a blatantly
redistributive program. Indeed, such a system could even aggravate racial
animosities. "'The average Mississippian,' wrote the Jackson Daily News,
'can't imagine himself chipping in to pay pensions for able-bodied Negroes
to sit around in idleness on front galleries, supporting all their kinfolks on
pensions, while cotton and corn crops are crying for workers to get them
out of the grass."'
84
81 Wilbur J. Cohen, The Social Security Act of 1935: Reflections Fifty Years Later, in
1935 REPORT, supra note 43, at 5, 7 [hereinafter Wilbur J. Cohen].
82 Id.
83 WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 131
(1963).
84 Id. Apparently, there was also a fear that national legislation on pensions would
serve as a precedent for federal intrusion in the area of race relations at the state law level.
Edwin E. Witte kept a contemporaneous diary during the time that he served as Executive
Director of the Committee on Economic Security though this contemporaneous diary was
not published until his death in 1962. In it, he wrote that the old-age assistance portion of
the proposed legislation
was very bitterly attacked, particularly by Senator Byrd, on the score that it
vested in a federal department the power to dictate to the states to whom pensions
should be paid and how much. In this position, Senator Byrd was supported by
nearly all of the southern members of both committees, it being very evident that
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To avoid this, one option could have been to extend the income tax
from the wealthy to the lower classes, with the result that their wages would
then come within the income tax system. If that had been done, their wage
income would have been taxed only once at the federal level-even as the
income tax itself expanded to raise more revenue with World War 1-and
the increased revenues obtained under the general income tax from this
expansion could have funded the payments made under the program. In
other words, Social Security spending would have been simply one more
government program supported by general tax revenues. The government,
however, would collect those general tax revenues from the lower and
middle classes (which would benefit from the new program) as well as the
wealthy.
But there were important political reasons for the separate tax. If the
"tax" could be sold as an "insurance contribution" rather than a "tax," and
Social Security benefits perceived as simply the return for which prior
premiums were paid, President Roosevelt believed that "by virtue of a
statutory 'compact' between the contributors and Congress,. . . a future
President and Congress could not, morally or politically, repeal or mutilate
the 'entitlement' character of the program." 85  His observation has held
true.
86
at least some southern senators feared that this measure might serve as an
entering wedge for federal interference with the handling of the Negro question
in the South. The southern members did not want to give authority to anyone in
Washington to deny aid to any state because it discriminated against Negroes in
the administration of old age assistance.
EDWIN E. WIrTE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 143-44 (1962)
[hereinafter EDWIN E. WITTE]. He remarked that "[t]he fact is that it had never occurred to
any person connected with the Committee on Economic Security that the Negro question
would come up in this connection." Id. at 144. Nevertheless, he describes changes that were
made to the bill to satisfy these concerns. See id. at 144-45.
85 Wilbur J. Cohen, supra note 81, at 7-8.
"I guess you're right on the economics," Roosevelt conceded when told that the
employee contributions were a mistake, "but those taxes were never a problem of
economics. They are politics all the way through. We put those payroll
contributions there so as to give the contributors a legal, moral, and political right
to collect their pensions and their unemployment benefits. With those taxes in
there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social security program."
LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 83, at 133.
86 Another reason that extending the income tax downward would have been a
problematic approach is that the Social Security program had many exemptions in its early
history. It was thought unfair to impose taxes on all lower- and middle-class families when
only a portion of them would be eligible to obtain future benefits under the system.
Excluded from the system were the self-employed as well as those employed in agriculture,
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Moreover, there was simply no need at the time to expand the income
tax downward, as opposed to enacting a separate tax on wages, in order to
avoid a future "double tax" problem, since the income tax was itself
thought at the time to be a tax that would never reach the lower and middle
classes. It was, therefore, not likely foreseen that the labor income of these
lower- and middle-class workers would soon be taxed twice--once under
the new payroll tax and once under the income tax. As Professor Carolyn
Jones related:
In testimony before the Senate Finance Committee in 1932,
Herbert Hoover's Treasury Secretary, Ogden Mills, aptly
described the very limited scope of the individual income tax up to
that time. "We have become accustomed," he said, "to high
exemptions and very low rates on the smaller taxable incomes.
That is our fixed conception of an income tax and it is very
difficult as a practical matter to change fixed conceptions of this
character."
'87
She went on to note that this "fixed conception" remained prominent
through the middle and late 1930s in Roosevelt's New Deal, when the
payroll tax was enacted. "In public pronouncements, Roosevelt and
prominent Congressmen linked income taxpaying to plutocracy and
rejected imposition of income taxes upon 'average' citizens." 88 Moreover,
Congress agreed.
Congress was ... quite clear as to who should not be paying
income taxes. When Senator LaFollette proposed reducing
exemptions to $2,000 for couples and $800 for singles [in 1935],
domestic service, by the Federal government, and by state and local governments, as well as
all charitable, educational, religious, scientific, etc., organizations and their employees. See
EDWIN E. WITrE, supra note 84, at 152-57. Writing in 1946, Eliot J. Swan noted that "the
fact that only certain groups were included made it difficult to justify the use of general
revenues." Eliot J. Swan, Economic Aspects of Social Security (1946), reprinted in
READINGS IN SOCIAL SECURITY 559, 560-61 (William Haber & Wilbur J. Cohen eds., 1948).
While this formally created a separate tax on the wages of much of the lower and middle
classes, it is not too far afield to characterize the 1935 legislation as expanding the income
tax downward, albeit under a separate flat-rate schedule and with no deductions, to the lower
and middle classes to fund increased federal spending on a new social program. The vast
majority of laborers owed no income tax on their labor income, and the vast majority of
laborers had no significant capital income, so taxing only their wages under the payroll tax
was tantamount to expanding the income tax to them, albeit under a different rate schedule.
87 Jones, supra note 41, at 688 (citing Revenue Act of 1932: Hearings on H.R. 10236
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932)).
88 Id. at 689.
[Vol. 22:1
Tax Burdens on Labor Income
he was soundly defeated. At a time when three-fourths of
American families were at or below the $2,000 level at which they
could live decently, Sen. Alben Barkley argued that LaFollette's
measure would hurt the "average citizens" and "average families"
"whether we consider the average man as one who receives less
than $5,000 a year or the one who receives less than $10,000 a
year-we can make up our own average to suit our own view of
what an average ought to be."
89
Instead, Congress "increased surtaxes on those with incomes over $50,000,
making a top bracket of 79 percent for income over $5 million. For three
years thereafter only John D. Rockefeller qualified for this most
stratospheric of tax brackets." This attitude toward income taxation
continued through the 1930s.
This perception of the income tax as a weapon to be used only
against the wealthy persisted in 1936. In his acceptance speech at
the Democratic convention in Philadelphia, Roosevelt claimed to
have enlisted in a war against the "economic royalists" who had
crowded out "many thousands of small business men and
merchants who sought to make a worthy use of the American
system of initiative and profit." In an October 1936 campaign
address at Worcester, Massachusetts, FDR spoke of the "struggle
to maintain democracy in America"-a struggle between "the vast
majority of our citizens" and "a small, but powerful group which
has fought the extension of [the] benefits of democracy, because it
did not want to pay a fair share of their cost." The politics of class
division were clearly at work. Tax relief should be given to the
average working American, while the wealthy should be more
heavily taxed.
The Revenue Act of 1937 again played upon the theme of
unfairly low level of taxes paid by the wealthy. The
Administration recommended loophole closing, and Congress
responded with hearings detailing tax avoidance and evasion by
sixty-seven wealthy families. Foreign and domestic personal
holding companies, hobby losses, incorporated yachts and country
estates, and personal service corporations were just a few of the
devices resorted to by the well-to-do. For Roosevelt, plutocratic
tax evasion and avoidance focused income tax reform upon the
very small group of Americans already subject to income taxation
89 Id. at 691 (footnotes omitted) (citing 79 CONG. REc. 13,207-13,208 (1935)).
90 Jones, supra note 41, at 690-91 (footnotes omitted).
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instead of upon measures that would have broadened the tax base
and the role of the income tax as a source of federal revenue.
Polls from 1938-39 suggest lack of public support for
reductions in taxes "on people with high incomes", and a plurality
of support for publicity of the income tax returns "of rich men."
Proposals for base broadening were not well received. A poll in
January 1938 asked if a married man earning less than $2,500 a
year should be required to pay a federal income tax. Eighty
percent said no, although that figure fell to 64 percent in a
February 1939 poll that asked a similar question. This view
supported exemption of over three-fourths of the American
population from income taxation.
9 1
When the income tax itself was, however, finally expanded to reach the
labor income of the lower classes as well beginning in the early 1940s with
World War II and the subsequent Cold War, the wage income of the lower
and middle classes was, for the first time, doubly taxed at the federal level.
But, as noted above, the rates were relatively low for the lower classes
under both tax systems at this time. 92 Also as noted above, however, this is
increasingly no longer true for lower- and middle-class taxpayers, bringing
the double taxation problem for them to a head only now-in the twenty-
first century.
93
V. LINKING FUTURE BENEFITS TO TAXES PAID: IS THE PAYROLL TAX
ACTUALLY A "DOUBLE TAX" ON LABOR INCOME?
To the extent that payroll taxes are not really "taxes," the "double tax"
(or high tax on labor income) fairness critique with respect to middle- and
lower-class labor income disappears. As more fully described below, some
economists have implicitly argued that the payroll taxes are not actually
"taxes" to the extent that they purchase an equivalent amount of future
benefits personal to that particular taxpayer. Further, politicians have been
quick to jump on such implications. Senator Phil Gramm, for one, said that
a payroll tax cut is tantamount to "giving a tax cut to people who do not pay
taxes. '94 One of the key issues that must be resolved in determining the
propriety of integrating the two taxes on labor income, therefore, is the
91 Id. at 691-93 (footnotes omitted).
92 See discussion supra Part 11.
93 See discussion supra Part III.
94 Heidi Glenn & Warren Rojas, Column A, Column B: Washington Orders Up $50-
$75 Billion Stimulus, 93 TAx NoTEs 167, 169 (2001).
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question of whether payroll taxes paid with respect to a particular worker
are properly viewed as purchasing future retirement and health benefits for
that worker and are thus not a "tax." I ultimately reject this approach.
While studies examining the tax paid and benefits received by various
demographic cohorts can provide helpful information in designing the tax-
and-transfer system and in predicting funding needs, their approach (if
taken literally) fundamentally mischaracterizes the Social Security system.
In measuring tax burdens, some economists assert that the marginal
payroll tax rate should be calculated by reducing the legislated rate to take
account of the present value of the future old-age and survivors benefits
expected to be received under the Social Security system upon retirement.
As Mitrusi and Poterba phrase it, "From a life-cycle perspective, the
marginal burden of the social security payroll tax on an individual's current
earnings is not the current marginal rate, but rather this marginal rate net of
the marginal increase in the present value of future program benefits that
flows from higher current earnings." 95  Or, as Burkhauser and Turner
stated, "When a marginal dollar of wage earnings yields an increase in
future social security benefits, this offsets the stated payroll tax on that
dollar."
' 96
This analytical approach reveals that those retiring in the present (as
well as in the past) will-as a group-receive far more in benefits than
they paid in payroll taxes, and thus their marginal payroll tax rate during
their working lives was low or negative. Those retiring in the not-distant
future, however, will increasingly face higher and higher marginal payroll
tax rates. For example, Burkhauser & Turner state:
In our calculations, we show that for retired workers aged 65 in
1982, the increase in the present value of social security benefits
associated with an additional dollar of covered earnings at younger
ages exceeded the additional social security taxes paid on those
earnings. Thus, for workers who anticipated future benefits, social
security acted at the margin as a wage subsidy rather than as a tax.
This situation will not continue for younger workers now in the
system. It is likely that for many workers born after World War II,
the true payroll tax will operate as a tax throughout life, although
95 Mitrusi & Poterba, Changing Importance, supra note 47, at 114-15.
96 Richard V. Burkhauser & John A. Turner, Is the Social Security Payroll Tax a Tax?,
13 PUB FIN. Q. 253, 254 (1985); see also C. Eugene Steuerle & Jon M. Bakija, How Social
Security Redistributes Income, 62 TAx NOTEs 1763, 1766 n.13 (1994) (collecting other
similar studies),
2002]
Virginia Tax Review
at less than the legislated rate.
97
As the quotation above indicates, Burkhauser and Turner thus characterize
as a true "tax" only those payments that do not bring a directly related
individual benefit, as opposed to the more diffuse benefits realized by
society as a whole when general tax revenues are spent for the common
good (i.e., for such goods as defense, our federal court system, etc.).
Others reach similar conclusions. The Congressional Research Service
recently released a report that examined "the value Social Security provides
each generation of workers in relationship to the Social Security taxes they
pay. It concludes:
Under the economic assumptions most commonly used by the
Social Security Trustees and congressional policymakers, a worker
who always earned the MINIMUM WAGE, who retires at age 65
in 2001, and has a dependent spouse will recover the value of the
RETIRMENT PORTION of his or her [Social Security] taxes plus
interest in 3.4 years; the payback times for a similar worker
retiring in 2010, 2020, and 2030 are projected to be 3.9, 4.1, and
3.9 years, respectively.
In 1980, it took 4.4 years for a worker who always earned the
97 Burkhauser & Turner, supra note 96, at 263. Steuerle and Bakija agree. They
conclude that "almost all individuals who have retired in any year between 1940 and
today-no matter what their income level or family type-have received large positive
transfers from Social Security beyond the sum of their contributions to the system and a
reasonable rate of return on those contributions." Steuerle & Bakija, supra note 96, at 1767.
They also conclude that "[p]ositive net transfers are eliminated for high-/average-wage two-
earner couples retiring after the turn of the century [and that] high-wage single workers and
two-earner couples retiring in the 2020s and later will face very large negative transfers (or
positive net lifetime taxes) from the system." Id. at 1770. The one exception they see is the
one-earner couple.
High-wage one-earner couples retiring in the near future receive very large
transfers, often exceeding $100,000 . . . . Indeed, high-income one-earner
couples retiring before the turn of the century continue to receive larger net
transfers than anyone else. Under our projections, positive subsidies continue to
flow to high-wage one-earner couples retiring as late as 2050. As we move into
the next century, moreover, average-wage one-earner couples will continue to
receive larger transfers than low-wage couples.
Id.
98 GEOFFREY KOLLMANN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TAXES AND BENEFITS FOR PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE RETIREES
(June 22, 2001), reprinted in CRS Examines Social Security Benefits for Past, Present, and
Future Retirees, TAX NOTES TODAY (July 6, 2001) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec.
cit., 2001 TNT 129-15) [hereinafter CRS REPORT].
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Social Security MAXIMUM WAGE, and who retired at age 65
with no dependent spouse, to recover the value of his AND HIS
EMPLOYER'S [Social Security] taxes plus interest. The payback
period for a similar worker retiring in 2001 is 37.7 years, and in
2030 will be 102.6 years.
For workers with no dependent spouse retiring at age 65 in
2030 who always earned an AVERAGE WAGE, at a 1% real
interest rate they would recover their and their employer's [Social
Security] taxes in 15.1 years; at 2% in 22.1 years; and at 3% in
33.6 years. However, at 4% and higher real interest rates, the
payback times become virtually infinite, i.e., the taxes would
never be recovered.
99
Stated a different way, Steuerle and Bakija conclude that "a high-/average-
wage two-earner couple turning 65 in 2030 faces net taxes or negative
transfers of approximately $173,500. . .; their benefits will be worth about
74 percent of their contributions." 100 And stated in yet another way,
Caldwell et al. conclude that people born in 1995 and later would enjoy a
rate of return approaching zero, meaning that they "would barely get back
what they put in, making the program akin to a mandatory zero-interest
long-term savings account or to a program that transferred about 80 percent
of their tax contributions to members of older generations and then invested
the remaining 20 percent at a market interest rate."
10 1
Mitrusi and Poterba reach similar conclusions on the numbers, and
they also report how many taxpayers in each income spectrum have a
higher marginal payroll tax rate than marginal income tax rate if the stated
payroll tax rate is adjusted for net future benefits to be received under the
Social Security system.l°2 They conclude:
While the fraction of families in the lowest income category (less
than $10,000 per year) for whom the marginal payroll tax rate
exceeds the marginal income tax rate is still substantial (44.6
percent), for most other income groups this probability drops
sharply. For all families, there is only a 9.2 percent chance that
the net-of-benefits payroll tax rate exceeds the marginal personal
income tax rate. For families with adjusted AGI above $20,000,
the chance that the net-of-benefits payroll tax rate exceeds the
99 Id.
100 Steuerle & Bakija, supra note 96, at 1770.
101 SHAVIRO, supra note 13, at 33 (citing Steven Caldwell et al., Social Security's
Treatment of Postwar Americans, 13 TAx POL'Y & EcON. 109 (1999)).
102 See Mistrusi & Poterba, Changing Importance, supra note 47, at 113 tbl.8.
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income tax rate is very low. This very substantial change in part
reflects the fact that small reductions in marginal payroll tax rates,
beginning at a level of 15.3 percent, bring many families across a
key threshold-the 15-percent income tax bracket. Small changes
therefore change their payroll tax rate from greater than to less
than their income tax rate.
103
Like many generally stated statistics, these results can, however, take
on an aura of solidity in general discourse that masks their inherent and
deep uncertainties.
Not only do analysts disagree on the proper techniques to use in
making calculations, there are often fundamental disagreements
involving subjective factors: what work patterns to use; what part
of the Social Security tax to count; whether or not to include
dependents' benefits; whether or not to include the employer's
share of the tax; what rate of interest to use; and whether or not to
include the effect of income taxation of benefits.
10 4
As one example, variations in the interest rate used to calculate the
"'return" on payroll taxes have huge effects on the results.
For example, workers retiring at age 65 in 2030 who always
earned the average wage would recover the retirement portion of
their and their employer's [Social Security] taxes in 11.9 years at a
1% real [i.e., above inflation] interest rate, in 16.1 years at a 2%
real interest rate, in 23.5 years at a 3% real interest rate, and 44.4
years at a 4% real interest rate. At a 5% real interest rate,
however, the point is reached where the annual interest earned on
the accumulation of taxes plus prior interest income exceeds the
annual benefit payments, so that the principal is never depleted-
in fact, it plus interest grows indefinitely. 
105
I do not mean, however, to quibble with the interest-rate or other
demographic assumptions made in these studies or even to quibble with
their results. Rather, what I challenge is their implicit message that it is
appropriate to view the Social Security system as nothing more than a
government-sponsored pension plan when analyzing the distribution of
103 Id. at 117.
104 CRS REPORT, supra note 98.
105 Id.; see also SHAVIRO, supra note 13, at 34 (stating that "[w]hat rate to use... has
proven highly controversial" and noting that rates used in recent studies ranged from two
percent to seven percent).
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"tax" burdens. If Social Security "taxes" are viewed as nothing more than
the equivalent of government-mandated pension plan contributions, which
will generate an individual return personal to the taxpayer, then they are
arguably not "taxes" at all (and thus not a "double" tax on labor income).
One of the most vociferous opponents of the analogy of Social Security
taxes to pension plan contributions is Patricia Dilley. 10 6  She views the
analogy as nothing more than misleading rhetoric, 10 7 no matter how
common and widespread the impression.
Payroll taxes are merely a method of financing the system, not the
basis for benefits earned and paid out. Benefit calculations are
made based on earnings recorded in the Social Security
system . . . . [B]enefit calculations do not take into account the
amount of taxes paid, and benefits cannot be reduced in the event
of a failure to pay such taxes by the employer who is responsible
for withholding [Social Security] taxes from workers' paychecks.
The [benefit] system could as easily be financed through income
tax revenues, like other government expenditures, without any
impact on the earnings-based benefit structure.
10 8
In short, Professor Dilley views the payment of Social Security taxes as
unrelated to the receipt of future benefits. Rather, the retiree's economic
106 See generally Dilley, Rhetoric, supra note 43; Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of
Entitlement: Retirement Income and the Problems of Integrating Private Pensions and
Social Security, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1063 (1997) [hereinafter Dilley, Entitlement]. In
criticizing the integration of the employer portion of Social Security taxes with the
nondiscrimination rules for qualified plan contributions, Nancy Altman has also rejected the
analogy.
Employers are paying a percentage of their worker's salaries into Social
Security. However, the payment is a tax, not a pension contribution. The
benefits for which the employer is contributing are not for its current workers, but
for workers now retired, from an earlier generation, perhaps before this employer
was even in business. To construe the employer's contribution as something
other than a general tax and the employee's benefit as somehow purchased in part
by the employee's employer is carrying a useful political fiction to an illogical
extreme.
Nancy J. Altman, Rethinking Retirement Income Policies: Nondiscrimination, Integration,
and the Quest for Worker Security, 42 TAx L. REV. 433, 485 (1987) (footnote omitted).
107 "[T]he misleading private pension analogy used to sell the Social Security program
from the New Deal forward [is] directly attributable to the distorting effect of the insistence
on individual property rights as the basis for economic rights." Dilley, Rhetoric, supra note
43, at 984.
108 Id. at 1000 (footnotes omitted).
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right to a claim on the country's resources to support consumption in
retirement is attributable to the claimant's prior demonstration of
"worthiness" through his attachment to the workforce for the requisite
number of quarters. It is the "lifetime of work,"' 10 9 not the payment of
Social Security taxes, that raises the Social Security entitlement. This is the
antithesis to both the retirement annuity model and the relief-of-poverty
model, which is based on need rather than worthiness.
The public retirement entitlement is a public obligation
designed to protect the public interest in social stability and
orderly labor force exit by the elderly. The public entitlement is
backed by the public taxing power and meets the public need for
assurance of old age income security for all workers through
redistribution of tax revenues. The notion of public advance
"funding," and indeed the emphasis of the original designers of
Social Security on payroll tax financing as the equivalent of
private pension contributions, is an example of a useful analogy
taking over the analysis and distorting the comparison beyond
meaningful limits.110
Important design features of the system also highlight this
disconnection between taxes and benefits. 1" For example, married workers
109 Id. at 1003.
110 Id. at 1035.
III A technical level at which the link between taxes and benefits is severed is in the
legislation itself, which formally treats them separately, though this separation was done
purely for concerns about the legislation's constitutionality and did not reflect a substantive
decision to break the link between taxes and benefits. For that reason, the technical
separation is best viewed as just that.
In the original version of the bill drafted by the Committee on Economic Security, the
new tax and the benefit structure provisions were closely intertwined, clearly indicating a
link between this new federal tax and this new benefit system. But
[i]t was widely feared that so great an expansion of federal activities would be
ruled unconstitutional by the then conservative Supreme Court. . . . For these
and other reasons, . . the old-age provisions were divided into separate taxing
and spending clauses-to make the program seem less like an insurance system
operated by the federal government and more like an exercise of the
government's expressed constitutional powers to tax and spend in new ways.
Pifer & Chisman, supra note 43, at xi.
Edwin E. Witte, in his contemporaneous diary of events, noted that the Supreme Court
ruled the Railroad Retirement Act unconstitutional "a few days after the Senate Finance
Committee began executive sessions on the social security bill" and that "[1]anguage used in
this decision seemed to apply also to the old age insurance provisions of the social security
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who are paid less than their spouses will receive benefits based on their
spouses' higher earnings. Thus, they receive no "benefit" for Social
Security taxes paid by themselves and their employers. This is also true for
individuals who work fewer than ten years.
Moreover, a portion of the Social Security tax base goes toward paying
dependent benefits. Nevertheless, workers must bear the full payroll tax
even if they have no dependents. In addition, only the thirty-five highest
years of earnings are counted toward computing Social Security benefits.
Thus, "a person who works for 15 years at $30,000 gets as much in benefits
as someone who works for 30 years at $15,000; a person who works 50
years at $10,000 gets much less than someone who works 25 years at
$20,000 and so forth .... ,,112 Finally, the disconnection between payroll
tax payments and benefits received, on an individual basis, is particularly
evident in the case of Medicare, since there is no correlation between the
amount of taxes paid and the amount of Medicare benefits that one can
receive.
Probably the most fundamental disconnection between taxes and
benefits, however, is that Social Security taxes paid today by Taxpayer X
are not linked to Taxpayer X's future benefits (as would be an annuity
contribution by Taxpayer X). Instead, these taxes fund payments to current
retirees under our pay-as-you-go system. 113 Indeed, because annual Social
bill." EDWIN E. WITr, supra note 84, at 100. He recounts what happened as follows:
The entire plan was very objectionable to [House draftsman] Mr. Beaman
and seemed unconstitutional to the leading members of the Ways and Means
Committee. These members agreed that if the benefits and the tax were really
separated, the plan might be constitutional, but that there was no real separation
between these two in the original bill. Beaman was then instructed to redraft the
bill to make such a separation. The major change was to drop all reference to an
old age insurance fund. Instead of such a fund, an old age reserve account was
set up in the Treasury; but the proceeds of the tax were not allocated to the old
age reserve account or the payment of old age benefits. All provisions which
related the benefits to the tax paid by the employers and their employees were
eliminated, as well as all references to any contractual rights to benefits. What
the Ways and Means Committee and Beaman, acting under its instructions,
sought to do was to get away from an insurance plan altogether, but to establish
the equivalent of such a plan without resorting to a definite insurance scheme.
Id. at 146-47. In short, the technical separation between the taxing provisions and the
spending provisions was done solely out of concerns for the constitutionality of the
provisions. The legislation was held to be constitutional in Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548 (1937) and Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
112 Lee Cohen et al., supra note 27, at 4.
113 As the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security recognized:
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Security tax receipts currently exceed by a substantial margin the amount
currently paid in benefits each year, the surplus receipts have been routinely
spent to support general federal government activities and programs.
Because the presently retired generation will receive more in aggregate
benefits than they paid in aggregate taxes (even with an interest-like return
factored in), the system is effectively redistributive between generations
(unlike a private annuity system).
Tax rates, in particular, were relatively low for those who are
currently retired or retired in the past, but have risen considerably
for those who are relatively young today. Since the formula for
determining benefits in Social Security gives no credit for paying
at a higher rate of tax, individuals gain nothing out of paying a
higher rate. One result has been a large redistribution among
generations, with more going to those around when the system
was younger and rates were lower. Some parts of this
redistribution were intended: in general, the goal was to help the
old through the contributions of the young, especially when
poverty rates among the old were high. 
114
Moreover, unlike a private annuity, the "return" (benefits) on
"principal" (essentially, average lifetime wages) is deliberately calibrated to
be redistributive within a single generational cohort as well. That is to say,
a greater percentage of low-income workers' earnings is replaced under the
Social Security formula than is replaced for high-income workers.
The [Social Security benefit] formula divides earnings into three
brackets. As in the income tax system, each bracket has a
percentage rate associated with it. The first dollars of earnings are
replaced at the highest percentage rate, the next level of bracketed
earnings at a lower rate, and the highest earnings at the lowest rate.
Workers with the very lowest levels of earnings have all their
earnings contained within the first bracket and consequently
Today's beneficiaries are not living off financial assets accumulated in the
past. Today's workers are not accumulating financial assets for the future.
Workers "invest" their payroll taxes not in financial assets but in the willingness
of future politicians to tax future workers to pay future benefits.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION TO STRENGTHEN SOCIAL SECURITY, INTERIM REPORT (July 24,
2001), reprinted in Bush's Social Security Commission Issues Text of Interim Report, TAx
NOTES TODAY (July 25, 2001) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2001 TNT 143-
43) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT].
114 Lee Cohen et al., supra note 27, at 3.
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replaced at the highest percentage rate.
11 5
Under current law, those three percentage replacement rates are 90%, 32%,
and 15%. 116 A worker with low earnings, in other words, may see 90% of
those earnings replaced. A worker with somewhat higher earnings will see
the first chunk replaced at a 90% rate but the next higher chunk replaced at
only a 32% rate, and so on. Adding to the redistributive nature of the
benefit formula is the fact that earnings of a worker above the taxable wage
base (currently $84,900) are ignored in calculating the benefit to be
received.
11 7
All of these system-design elements, which are inconsistent with the
private-pension analogy, point more generally to the public purposes
underlying the Social Security system articulated by Professor Dilley. The
taxes paid can be conceptualized as supporting society-wide goals and
benefits rather than merely individualized cash benefits. More specifically,
Social Security can be conceptualized as supporting society-wide goals and
benefits that happen to require cash payments and the provision of health
care during retirement. These goals and benefits are rooted in nurturing a
stable economic environment through subsidizing consumption
expenditures by the retired and by encouraging retirement itself, thus
permitting progress in the workplace by succeeding age cohorts. 118  As
Wilbur Cohen phrased it, Social Security was a "built-in stabilizer of
consumer buying power, permitting the continued functioning of the
market-price-profit system in a work-oriented free enterprise economy."
' 119
President Roosevelt, when signing the bill, also referred to this aspect of the
115 Nancy J. Altman, The Reconciliation of Retirement Security and Tax Policies: A
Response to Professor Graetz, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1419, 1431 (1988).
116 Lee Cohen et al., supra note 27, at 3.
117 See Altman, supra note 106, at 476-78. It must also be noted that these
redistributive effects are reduced if one takes into account the reduced life expectancies that
are typically associated with low income. "[L]ower income and shorter life expectancies are
related. . . .As a result, [the] likelihood of [low-income people] receiving Social Security
retirement benefits is probably lower than for high-income people." Steuerle & Bakija,
supra note 96, at 1772; see also Study Shows Poor People Die Sooner Than Affluent, CLEV.
PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 12, 2001, at E4.
This redistributive function would be difficult to replicate with private accounts,
which, depending on one's point of view, is either a strength or a weakness of privatization
proposals. But see SHAVIRO, supra note 13, at 146-57 (proposing that private accounts be
coupled with redistributive lump-sum payments at retirement from the accounts of high
earners to the accounts of low earners).
118 See Dilley, Rhetoric, supra note 43, at 1032 (noting that Social Security and related
programs were seen as labor force management programs).
119 Wilbur J. Cohen, supra note 81, at 10.
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new program.
It is a structure intended to lessen the force of possible future
depressions. It will act as a protection to future Administrations
against the necessity of going deeply into debt to furnish relief to
the needy. The law will flatten out the peaks and valleys of
deflation and of inflation. It is, in short, a law that will take care
of human needs and at the same time provide the United States an
economic structure of vastly greater soundness. 
120
Commissions appointed in the early years to study and make
recommendations with respect to the Social Security system echoed this
theme when they recommended using general tax revenues to help fund
Social Security. They did so because of the general, more widespread
societal benefits, including a more stable economic infrastructure, achieved
through the system. For example, the 1937-1938 Advisory Council on
Social Security Final Report stated:
Since the nation as a whole, independent of the beneficiaries of
the system, will derive a benefit from the old-age security
program, it is appropriate that there be Federal financial
participation in the old-age insurance system by means of
revenues derived from sources other than pay-roll taxes.
Governmental participation in financing of a social insurance
program has long been accepted as sound public policy in other
countries. Definite limits exist in the proper use of pay-roll taxes.
An analysis of the incidence of such taxes leads to the conviction
that they should be supplemented by the general tax program. The
prevention of dependency is a community gain in more than social
terms. 121
The Advisory Council on Social Security, Old-Age and Survivors Insurance
in 1948 similarly reported to the Senate Finance Committee as follows:
The Council believes that the Federal Government should
120 Presidential Statement Signing the Social Security Act (Aug. 14, 1935), reprinted in
1935 REPORT, supra note 43, at 145.
121 1937-1938 ADviSORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY FINAL REPORT, reprinted in
1935 REPORT, supra note 43, at 198. Later, Wilbur Cohen recalled that "[t]he Vandenburg-
Murray amendment which was in the law during 1943-1950 authorized a government study,
but this provision was never utilized." WILBUR J. COHEN, RETIREMENT POLICIES UNDER
SOCIAL SECURITY 5 n. 15 (1957).
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participate in financing the old-age and survivors insurance
system. A Government contribution would be a recognition of the
interest of the Nation as a whole in the welfare of the aged and of
widows and children. Such a contribution is particularly
appropriate, in view of the relief to the general taxpayer which
results from the substitution of social insurance for part of public
assistance.
... In our opinion, the cost of financing the accrued liability
should not be met solely from the pay-roll contributions of
employers and employees. We believe that this burden would
more properly be borne, at least in part, by the general revenues of
the Government.122
And, writing in 1946, economist Eliot J. Swan wrote:
It would probably not be desirable to abandon the contributory
principle entirely, but in a comprehensive system, benefits could
be met in large part from general revenues. The wider the
insurance coverage and the more general the understanding and
acceptance of social insurance as a necessary public responsibility
that, like public education, conveys indirect benefits to all
members of the community, the more appropriate it becomes to
draw upon general revenues. The right of individuals to benefits
and the guarantee that future obligations will be met do not rest on
the fact that claimants have a previous contribution record nor on
reserves built up from such contributions, but on the harmony of
social insurance with the economic and social desires of the
nation. 123
In short, the repeated recommendations that the government use
general revenues to supplement payroll tax revenues are premised on the
broader societal goals and purposes sought to be accomplished through
Social Security. Thus, the Social Security tax can be viewed as an
undifferentiated federal tax that supports widespread societal goals, just as
the presence of a well-developed judicial system supports our economy and
benefits all of us, not simply those who actually appear in court.
The temptation to link Social Security taxes paid by a particular worker
to future benefits to be received by that particular worker is understandable.
122 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
FINANCE, 80TH CONG., OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE 204 (2d Sess. 1943), reprinted
in READINGS IN SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 86, at 304, 306.
123 Swan, supra note 86, at 561.
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After all, the benefits (unlike most government benefits) are defined in cash
and can be calculated, if imperfectly, on an individual basis. Nevertheless,
the attempt fundamentally mischaracterizes the system for the preceding
reasons. Taxes simply are not investments. Moreover, we do not
commonly engage in the same inquiry with respect to the "income" tax
paid. That is to say, we do not perceive the income tax burden nominally
shouldered by an individual to be reduced by the value of benefits
purchased with those taxes, such as a functioning court system, national
defense, regulated capitalism, etc. Indeed, if we did so, those in the tax
brackets that are nominally the highest might be seen as subject to much
lower rates of taxation, since the wealthiest in society arguably benefit most
from the expenditures necessary to maintain our regulated capitalist system.
The illogical conclusion of such an exercise is that the only real "tax" paid
by the population as a whole is the amount of revenue collected that is
wasted instead of spent to provide benefits to the population.
Return to the proposal briefly discussed earlier regarding the repeal of
the Social Security tax wage ceiling-and the concomitant slashing of the
Social Security tax marginal rates-as an alternative to explicitly
integrating the tax burden of the two taxes on labor income. Significantly
lower marginal rates under the Social Security tax, closer to historical
standards, could deal with the equity problem while not creating a huge
budget shortfall. This would be true, however, only if the progressive
payment formula, under which wages above the $84,900 wage ceiling are
not factored into the replacement formula, remained intact. What about the
argument that repealing the ceiling on the tax side while maintaining it on
the benefit side is unfair?
That argument is, once again, premised on viewing the Social Security
tax paid by a particular individual as "purchasing" his or her future
correlative retirement benefit. Once the Social Security tax is seen as a true
tax that helps to support the infrastructure of our capitalist system by
maintaining consumption spending in the retired, decreasing the severity of
the hills and valleys of economic growth and contraction, etc., then that
criticism is weakened. If the tax is separated from the benefit system, there
is little reason to see why it should not also be progressive through
broadening the tax base (which would allow the lowering of rates), just as
the income tax is progressive.
But suppose that the reader is not convinced and rejects my discontent
with linking payroll taxes with the future benefits to be received on an
individual basis. Such a rejection does not, in fact, necessarily mean that
the payroll tax burden on labor income and the income tax burden on labor
income ought not to be integrated, though the equity arguments for doing so
might be lessened. The reader who accepts the personal and individual link
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between the old-age and survivors benefit received and Social Security
taxes paid explicitly conceptualizes Social Security taxes as forced
individual savings, like a pension plan. Perhaps such forced savings ought
to be deductible under the income tax (a form of integration) under the
analogy to those pension plan contributions that are tax-favored under our
hybrid income/consumption tax.124 The mandatory nature of the Social
Security system, however, weakens any analogy to the tax-preferred
retirement savings regimes, which seek to provide an incentive for
increasing voluntary retirement savings behavior by providing (more
favorable) consumption tax treatment to such savings than would otherwise
occur under a pure income tax. The more convincing conceptual approach
involves how integration analysis might proceed if the link between the
payroll taxes and benefits received is rejected. 1
25
VI. INTEGRATION IF THE LINK BETWEEN FUTURE BENEFITS AND TAXES
PAID Is ACCEPTED
A. The Old-Age and Survivors Tax as Forced Individual Savings
As indicated in contemporary writings, early notions of "social
security" were grandiose, involving funding for almost anything that could
contribute to overcoming defective social organization in the modem
industrialist state, such as education and vocational training, improved
nutrition, planned utilization of the labor supply to adjust for changes in
supply and demand, health care, housing-even the creation of enriching
forms of entertainment, such as opera. 126 Today, however, many people
view the Social Security system, particularly the old-age and survivors
portion, as nothing more than a pension fund similar to those provided by
private employers. This popular perception is acknowledged in the Interim
Report submitted by the commission appointed by President Bush to study
and make recommendations with respect to the Social Security system.
"Many people believe that Social Security is a national pension fund in
which workers make 'contributions' to an investment account called the
'Trust Fund.' When a worker retires, dies or becomes disabled, they believe
that his contributions, plus interest, are taken out of an account to pay
124 See discussion infra Part VI, which reviews this argument. I ultimately conclude
that it is weak.
125 See discussion infra Part VII.
126 See, e.g., Smith Simpson, Fundamental Principles, in WAR AND POST-WAR SOCIAL
SECURITY 1 (Wilbur J. Cohen ed., 1942); Osvald Stein, Fundamental Programs, in WAR
AND POST-WAR SOCIAL SECURITY, supra, at 6, 6-9.
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benefits."' 2 7 And, as indicated earlier, there might actually be instrumental
reasons for perpetuating this conception. What might the income tax
consequences of this portion of the payroll tax be if it is conceptualized as
forced individual savings?
Under a pure income tax, as conventionally described, the tax base
consists of amounts spent on (or, in certain instances, the market value of)
personal consumption plus net wealth increases (or less net wealth
decreases). 28  While contributing to a savings account or purchasing
another type of investment asset would be immediately deductible under a
consumption tax, since it is an outlay that does not purchase immediate
personal consumption, savings under a pure income tax are nondeductible.. 129
capital expenditures. The contribution to the savings account or the
purchase of the investment asset changes the form in which wealth is held
but does not diminish wealth and thus is nondeductible under an income
tax.
Thus, if the payroll tax is considered to be an instance of forced
individual savings, such as a deposit to a passbook savings account, it
would be neither deductible under nor creditable against a pure income tax.
Moreover, the inside build-up of the account would be taxable as it accrued.
We do not, however, have a pure income tax but rather a hybrid
income/consumption tax, with a realization requirement to boot, under
which much savings goes untaxed, as it would under a consumption tax.
Chief among these favored savings are most contributions to pension
plans and similar vehicles that Comply with rigorous nondiscrimination,
funding, vesting, and other standards. Both amounts contributed by
employers and amounts contributed by employees (or eligible self-
employed individuals) to these plans are excludable (or deductible), and the
inside build-up attributed to the contributions are not taxed to either the
employer, the employee, or the trust fund holding the assets. Amounts
distributed from the trust are then fully includable when received. That is
to say, employees enjoy consumption-tax treatment for this class of savings.
Other classes of savings, such as the passbook account or pension-plan
contributions to nonqualified pension plans, do not enjoy consumption-tax
treatment.
The employer portion of the Social Security tax, the economic
127 IN ERIM REPORT, supra note 113.
128 See JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, &
POLICY 31 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX].
129 See generally id. at 467-83 (contrasting income and consumption taxation and
describing how the nondeductibility of capital expenditures under an income tax is the
defining difference between it and a consumption tax).
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incidence of which is most likely borne by the employee, is essentially
accorded consumption-tax treatment. The employee excludes the portion of
"his" wages that his employer pays in tax, which is economically equivalent
to inclusion of those taxes by the employee as wages followed by an
offsetting deduction. Moreover, the inside build-up on the investment
account is not taxed to either the employer, the employee, or the trust fund
itself. Upon eventual payment, the rules in section 86, 13 which require
inclusion of a portion of Social Security benefits by taxpayers exceeding
certain thresholds of income, can be seen as roughly requiring inclusion of
the benefits attributable to the employer portion of the tax. 
131
What about the employee portion, however? From the beginning of
the Social Security system, 132 payments of the employee portion of the
Social Security tax have never been deductible or excludable from the
employee's gross wages for income tax purposes. The inside build-up on
the account is, like the employer portion, not taxed to anyone. Why is not
the employee portion of Social Security taxes deductible under the income
tax, just as are some employee contributions to qualified pension plans and
regular individual retirement accounts (IRAs) today? If it were made
deductible under this pension analogy, then section 86 should also be
amended to require full inclusion of benefits received, just as with other
pension distributions. This revision would greatly simplify the law. 
133
One reason, of course, could be that the pension analogy simply is
inapposite for the reasons described above. 134  For present purposes,
however, if we indulge in the notion that the employee portion of the Social
Security tax is analogous to a pension-plan contribution, why is it not
130 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
131 See Daniel Halperin, Description of Current Tax Treatment of Compensation iv
(2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Halperin, Description].
132 The initial legislation made clear that employees could not deduct their mandatory
Social Security tax payments under the income tax. Section 803 of the original act provided:
"For the purposes of the income tax imposed by Title I of the Revenue Act of 1934 or by
any Act of Congress in substitution therefor, the tax imposed by section 801 shall not be
allowed as a deduction to the taxpayer in computing his net income for the year in which
such tax is deducted from his wages." 1935 REPORT, supra note 43, at 93.
133 Alternatively, the nondeductibility of the employee portion of the Social Security
tax could be analogized to the Roth IRA, under which contributions are nondeductible but
distributions are excludable. If this approach were taken, fifty percent of Social Security
benefits, representing the employer contribution that was effectively excluded by the
employee, would be includable, while the remaining fifty percent, representing the
undeducted employee contribution, would be excludable. For the reasons stated in the text
regarding the variability of marginal rates over a lifetime, however, I think that the
deduction-inclusion approach would be preferable.
134 See discussion supra Part V.
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deductible?
Such an approach would likely have significant after-tax consequences
for most taxpayers. If a taxpayer's tax bracket is constant over time, Daniel
Halperin has shown that the
deferral of compensation [under the consumption-tax treatment
provided to qualified plans] does not affect the tax burden on the
compensation itself. While the tax is deferred, the tax base is
increased by the after-tax rate of return on investment. In present
value terms, the tax bases and thus the resulting tax are equal.
135
But many, if not most, taxpayers are likely in higher tax brackets in their
earning years than in their retirement years. If this is true, then deduction of
the payments in the high-earning years of middle age and inclusion in the
low-earning years of retirement can mean a higher total after-tax return than
would occur if Social Security taxes were nondeductible during the earning
years and benefits were excludable. A slightly different way of looking at it
is that, if the taxpayer's marginal rate is lower in retirement, inclusion at
that time is the effective equivalent of taxing a portion of the taxpayer's
lifetime earnings at this lower rate. Perhaps such a policy is worthwhile as
a rough form of lifetime averaging. In short, marginal rates are not
typically constant through the lifecycle, and most taxpayers are more likely
to be in a higher tax bracket in the years of payment than in the years of
receipt.
Several reasons converge to explain why Social Security taxes were
not made deductible by analogy to deductible employee contributions to
qualified plans. Deductible employee contributions to pension plans and
IRAs are a relatively recent phenomenon, beginning in earnest only in the
1980s. There were not many pension plans in the early twentieth century,
and employers funded the few that were there. 136  Economic incidence
analysis aside, the employer was seen as funding the plan, not the
employee. Moreover, most employees did not even owe income taxes,
since, as briefly described earlier, income taxes were imposed on only a
135 Halperin, Description, supra note 131, at ii. Halperin compares a $100 contribution
to a qualified plan with a 10% (tax-free) rate of return on behalf of a 40% bracket taxpayer
with a taxable contribution of $60 (paying $40 to the Treasury at the time of contribution)
with the same rate of return and demonstrates that the tax on the distribution from the
qualified plan is precisely equal to the future value of the $40 tax paid at the time of
contribution to a taxable plan. See id. at ii n.7. This equivalency holds true, however, only
if the taxpayer is in the same tax bracket at both points in time.
136 "Most early pension plans were noncontributory. That is, the plans were financed
completely by the employer who generally interpreted the obligation to pay benefits as
voluntary." Dilley, Entitlement, supra note 106, at 1114.
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small minority of the wealthiest citizens. Therefore, an income tax
deduction for the few employee contributions that were made would have
been a moot point. Finally, the income tax consequences of pension plans
were themselves just beginning to be threshed out in the era when the
Social Security system was adopted. 137 This combination of facts, explored
in more detail below, seems the most likely explanation of why the
employee portion of the Social Security tax was made nondeductible under
the income tax.
When Congress adopted the Social Security system, there were few
pension plans and few participants.
When the Social Security program was enacted, only about six
million persons, 15 percent of those employed, held jobs covered
by any sort of retirement system; only a tiny handful-perhaps
100,000 to 200,000-actually were receiving a pension. The
poorhouse toward the end of life-with all its horrors-was a very
real part of America.
138
The most widely accepted estimate of pension plans and
participation is that between 1875 and 1929 around 400 industrial
pension plans were established, with about that number still in
operation on the eve of the Depression.
The companies establishing these plans employed about 10%
of the industrial labor force-a force substantially less than the
entire work force including agricultural and casual labor. It is not
clear, however, how many of those employees were eligible to
participate in the plan or would eventually qualify for benefits.
According to a recent estimate, although industrial pensions were
not uncommon by 1935, no more than 4% of male workers and
3% of female workers met the requirements for receipt of pensions
at that time.
139
Moreover, almost none of the plans that did exist were funded in advance.
Rather, they took the form of promises by employers that employees would
be paid in retirement if the employee were still employed with the same
employer at that time.
137 "Only five pages of Murray Latimer's huge study [published in 1932], Industrial
Pension Systems, discuss federal tax laws." Wooten, supra note 74, at 1307.
138 Robert M. Ball, The 1939 Amendments to the Social Security Act and What
Followed, in 1935 REPORT, supra note 43, at 161, 161.
139 Dilley, Entitlement, supra note 106, at 1113-14.
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At the time of the stock market crash in 1929 .... only a small
minority of American workers were covered by private pension
plans and an even smaller percentage could ever expect to draw
benefits because of long vesting periods and eligibility terms that
often required the worker to be employed by the firm at the time
of retirement in order to receive benefits. Moreover, most pension
plans were not funded in advance, or were inadequately funded, as
no legal funding requirement was imposed on employers until
much later.
140
Industrial pension plans of large businesses, such as railroads, evolved as an
aid to personnel management, to ease the older worker out of the work
force
in a manner that economized on labor costs while producing a
smooth flow of employees through the firm .... The introduction
of the mandatory retirement provision arrangement promised to
harness expenses.., by allowing the firm to replace older, high-
wage workers with smaller numbers of younger, lower-paid
employees. Managers believed these savings would substantially
offset the additional cost of paying pensions to retiring
employees. 141
These early plans were pay-as-you-go plans, with employers paying
benefits out of current earnings, and these payments were deductible by
employers as ordinary and necessary business expenses under a 1911 ruling
interpreting the 1909 corporation excise tax that pre-dated the income tax.
Problems with funding crunches soon arose, however, and reformers argued
that employers should treat pension costs as accruing during the entire
working life of the employee instead of expensing them when paid after
retirement. 142 The reformers also encouraged advanced funding of these
pension promises. In 1919, the Internal Revenue Service (Service) allowed
employers to deduct advanced-funding payments to a trust so long as the
trust was "organized entirely separate and distinct from the corporation,
having its own set of books, making its own investments, and paying its
own expenses, legal title of which does not remain in the
corporation ... The employees on whose behalf these contributions
were made did not have to include the amounts in their incomes until
140 Dilley, Rhetoric, supra note 43, at 1028-29.
141 Wooten, supra note 74, at 1307-08.
142 See id. at 1308-10.
143 Id. at 1313 (quoting O.D. 110, 1 C.B. 224 (1919)).
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actually received, since (with the typically extremely weak rights the
workers had in these pension funds) it was not at all certain that the
employees would ever, in fact, receive them. 144 Thus, the big income tax
issue in the early days of funded plans was whether the separate trust
should be taxed on the income earned on contributions in the interim
between the contribution and distribution to retired employees. In 1921,
Congress provided that stock bonus and profit-sharing trusts were not
taxable so long as the trusts were made irrevocable by the companies
funding them. While unclear whether irrevocable pension trusts were
similarly treated under the 1921 law, even though not explicitly mentioned,
the Code was formally amended in 1926 to make pension trusts tax-
exempt.1
45
Thus, when the Social Security system was adopted, employer
contributions to pension trusts were deductible (if the pension trust
qualified), employees did not include these contributions in their gross
income, employees did not include the earnings on these contributions in
their gross income while they accrued, and they included benefits only
when actually received. The employer portion of Social Security tax
payments mirrored this treatment to a great extent. Employers were
allowed to deduct these payments immediately, the employee did not
include as wages that portion paid by the employer, and no earnings on the
employer's contribution were includable by the employee prior to
retirement. One big difference is that none of the Social Security benefit
received in retirement, even that portion attributable to the employer
contribution that was never taxed to the employee, was includable by the
employee at the time the Social Security program was adopted. As noted
earlier, a portion of Social Security benefits may today be includable for
income tax purposes. 146
As for the employee portion of the tax, it was nondeductible, as were
other employee contributions (if any) to pension plans, but most employees
did not owe income tax under the "class tax" of the time. Therefore, a
deduction by the employee under the income tax for the Social Security tax
that he or she paid would not have been a ripe issue for the vast majority of
employees.
144 In 1921, Congress provided that contributions to "stock bonus and profit-sharing"
plans were not includable by the employee "until... distributed or made available to the
extent that it exceeds the amounts paid in by him." See Wooten, supra note 74, at 1313
(quoting Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 219(f), 42 Stat. 227, 247 (1921)). The Service
informally extended the same treatment to pension plan contributions, and this treatment was
codified in 1926. See id. at 1314.
145 See id. at 1317.
146 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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When the class tax became a mass tax with legislation in the early
1940s, however, the tax treatment of employee contributions to pension
plans did become a ripe issue. Writing in 1943 in the Harvard Law Review,
Harvard Dean Erwin N. Griswold argued that Congress ought to change
the law so that employee contributions to pension funds, including the
employee portion of the Social Security tax, would be deductible under the
income tax when made, placing them on the same footing as contributions
by an employer. Thus, there are two interesting features to his article: the
substantive change that he argued with respect to employee contributions to
pension plans, and the fact that he assumed, without discussion, that the
employee portion of the Social Security tax was properly conceptualized as
such a contribution. He described the law at that time as follows:
Where the cost of providing retirement funds is paid entirely
by the employer under an approved pension plan, the employee
pays no tax until the retirement benefit is actually paid to him. But
this is not the case with respect to amounts which the employee
himself pays to provide his future pension benefits. The money
which he earns is taxable to him when he earns it, and the amounts
which he pays to provide retirement benefits are not deductible by
him, whether he pays them directly himself or they are withheld
from his pay by his employer pursuant to the contract of
employment. Thus, the law specifically provides that the amount
of social security tax withheld from an employee's wages is not
deductible in computing his income tax. There is a similar
provision as to amounts deducted from wages under the Railroad
Retirement Act. The Treasury ruled some time ago that the
amount of employees' contributions under private pension plans is
not deductible in computing their tax, and this ruling was applied
to deductions from the salaries of municipal employees. The same
position has long been taken by the Treasury with respect to
deductions from the salaries of federal employees under the Civil
Service Retirement Act, and this conclusion has recently been
sustained by the Tax Court. This rule is in effect legislated into
the Internal Revenue Code by the recent pension trust
amendments. 147
He then went on to criticize that law.
From the point of view of the employee, a true pension or
147 Erwin N. Griswold, The Tax Treatment of Employees' Contributions to Pension
Plans, 57 HARV. L. REV. 247, 247-48 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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retirement allowance is income in the year in which he receives
the money .... What the employee earns during his productive
years must, for all practical purposes, be spread over the period of
his life. What he receives after his retirement is in reality his
income then, for then is when it comes in to him. To tax him on it
at the top bracket of the graduated rates of his earning years is an
unfair failure to recognize the economic facts.
Arguments of the sort just outlined have been adopted in the
statute to make pension contributions of the employer taxable to
the employees only when the pension payments are actually
received. But no such consideration is given to the pension
contributions of the employee, and the question may fairly be
asked whether there is any sound basis for this distinction ....
[I]t is hard to find any substantial reason for making a distinction
between amounts paid by the employer to provide future pensions
and those withheld from the employee for the same purpose. In
both cases, the employee's current productive capacity is being
utilized to make provision for his retirement. Neither amount is
received by the employee any more than the other, for he does not
have any more right to obtain presently the amount withheld from
his pay than to obtain the additional amount paid by the employer.
Indeed, the distinction between the amounts paid by the employer
and those withheld from the employee is almost completely
formal. A plan may be set up under which the employee's salary
is stated to be $100, and the employer withholds $5 for pension
purposes and pays an additional $5 to the pension fund. Under
such a plan, the employee actually receives payment of $95 of his
salary and $10 is paid to the pension fund. Precisely the same
economic result would be reached if the employee's salary were
stated to be $105, with $10 withheld by the employer as the
employee's contribution to the pension fund, or if the employee's
salary were fixed at $95, with $10 paid to the pension fund by the
employer. Yet the tax consequences will vary sharply according
to whichever one of these formal plans is used.
As long as the plan is really a pension plan, the reasons which
have already led to the conclusion that the employer's payment in
such a case should not be taxable to the employee until the
employee actually receives it, should lead to the same conclusion
with respect to the similar payments which are withheld from the
employee's wages, either under state or federal law or under the
terms of the employment contract. To achieve this result, the tax
statutes should be expressly amended so as to provide that
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amounts paid by an employee to provide bona fide pension
benefits after his retirement should be deductible from his current
income. 
14 8
In effect, Dean Griswold argued that the reality of economic incidence
ought to be recognized. The distinction between whether the "employer"
makes the payment or the "employee" makes the payment is solely formal.
The economic incidence will fall on the employee in the form of depressed
current wages in an equivalent amount. Whether the payment is nominally
said to fall on the employer or employee should not make a difference in
tax treatment. If the "employer's" contribution should be excluded from
the employee's wage income for income tax purposes, then so should the
"employee' s" contribution. 149
While the Service did approve as "qualified plans" some salary
reduction plans in 1956,150 his argument did not carry the day legislatively
until enactment of the IRA provision in 1974 and enactment of section
401(k) in 1978. Widespread adoption of section 401(k) plans utilizing
employee contributions did not occur until the 1980s. 5 1 So, at least as a
148 Id. at 248-50 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
149 Dean Griswold recognized that perhaps neither should be rendered nontaxable to the
employee.
A literal argument can be made in support of [immediate taxation to the
employee] even where the employee's contribution is deducted from his pay and
he has no right to receive it in cash, since the employee has acquired something
of value in his retirement contract. The question remains, however, whether it is
wise to tax the employee currently on what is actually so remote, though
important, a benefit.
Id. at 248. He then went on to note that employer contributions were not taxable to the
employee when made and that there is no logical reason to treat employee contributions
differently.
150 See Daniel Halperin, Cash or Deferred Profit-Sharing Plans and Cafeteria Plans,
41 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAxx'N 39-1, 39-6 to 39-11 (1983) [hereinafter Halperin, Cash or
Deferred].
151 IRA eligibility was severely restricted, and section 401(k) received little attention
when first enacted. It was only after an accountant, Theodore Benna, saw the potential in
section 401(k) that it became popular as a pre-tax investment vehicle for employees. The
New Yorker magazine told the story this way:
In 1974, the first individual retirement accounts . . . were introduced, but the
standards for qualification were strict, and they didn't really catch on. In the Tax
Reform Act of 1978, legislators loosened things up a bit by allowing workers to
contribute their cash bonuses to retirement savings accounts on a tax-deferred
basis. The wording of this clause, No. 401(k), was vague, and it attracted the
attention of R. Theordore Benna, an employee-benefits consultant in Langhorne,
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practical matter, it has only been since the 1980s that there has been a
noticeable difference in treatment between some employee contributions to
qualified pension plans (deductible) and the payment by the employee of
the employee portion of the Social Security tax (nondeductible).
One response to the argument that Social Security taxes ought to be
deductible because they constitute forced savings analogous to qualified
pension plan contributions might be that the Social Security system is
technically not a "qualified plan." This argument, however, is not
persuasive. To be sure, the precise features regarding vesting, participation,
etc., required of qualified plans are not present in the Social Security
system, but the "big idea" picture is absolutely present. Under federal law,
Social Security participants are vested after a certain number of paid
quarters in the work force, there is no discrimination in favor of highly paid
participants, withdrawal cannot be made until age sixty-five, etc. In other
words, the concerns that led to the strictures imposed on qualified plans are
concerns that are dealt with in an equally effective way under the Social
Security system.
A more decisive argument for rejecting the qualified-plan analogy,
however, is that the decision whether or not to make a contribution to a
section 401(k) plan or an individual IRA is typically voluntary on the part
of the employee, while Social Security tax payments are mandatory. The
argument would be that only voluntary savings need to be made deductible
(in deviation from a pure "income" tax) in order to encourage the taxpayer
to make the savings decision. Since Social Security tax payments are
mandatory, there is no similar incentive effect at play, and tax-favored
treatment for certain types of savings (as opposed to all savings) is justified
only because of its incentive effect on behavior.
Scholars disagree about whether the origins of the favorable treatment
accorded qualified pension plans and similar arrangements were premised
Pennsylvania.
One Saturday afternoon in 1980, Benna, who was then thirty-nine years old,
was helping one of his clients, a local bank, to redesign its employee pension plan
when he had a thought. If cash bonuses could be sheltered from tax under clause
401(k), why couldn't regular income be sheltered in the same way? There didn't
appear to be anything in the statute that specifically ruled it out. "My approach
was that if the code doesn't say, 'Thou shalt not,' then thou should be able
to".... He designed a retirement plan that would allow employees to contribute
a portion of their paychecks to a savings account on a pretax basis. A few
months later, Benna's own firm, the Johnson Companies, launched the first
401(k) plan. In November, 1981, the Internal Revenue Service gave Benna's
creation its official blessing. With legal approval, the new savings plans spread
rapidly, and by 1985 more than ten million employees had one.
John Cassidy, Striking it Rich, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 14, 2002, at 63, 63-64.
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on this incentive effect. James Wooten argues that policymakers at the time
appreciated that these earnings ought to be attributed to workers, not to the
employers, and that most workers owed no income tax at the time.
Therefore, the tax exemption of the pension fund was adopted, he argues, in
order to avoid a bias against deferred compensation, i.e., to achieve tax
neutrality with current compensation (a rate of zero for most workers). 
152
Norman Stein, on the other hand, sees little evidence for such
prescience on the part of policymakers. He finds other evidence indicating
that the exemption was adopted simply to encourage employers to adopt
funded pension plans. He believes that the record suggests that both
Congress and the Executive shared an understanding that funded pension
and profit-sharing plans served a public virtue and that a tax-deferral
regime should be extended to such plans in order to encourage employers to
sponsor them. The perspective from which the government viewed the
question of tax subsidization, however, would not have been through the
modern lens of plans as tax-advantaged deferred wages (and thus as tax
savings to the participants), but from the then predominant understanding of
plans as corporate commitments to make future gifts. Congress might have
seen allowing a current deduction of employer contributions, and
exemption of plan income, as a direct tax advantage to the employer rather
than to the employee. 1
53
[I]t is not at all clear that tax advisors, or legislators, of the day,
thought that individuals not subject to tax were subjected to a tax
penalty when they invested in a taxable financial
intermediary. . . . Most significant though, in a profit-sharing
plan with delayed vesting, the employer, rather than the employee,
might have been understood as benefiting from the deferral until
the employee obtained a nonforfeitable interest. Thus, the
exemption of the profit-sharing trust might have been seen as a
subsidy to the plan sponsor (tax-exempt advance funding of
compensation that did not have to be paid until the future), which
might have had the effect of encouraging employers to adopt
profit-sharing plans. 
154
But it is probably not necessary to resolve this dispute for current
purposes because, regardless of the origins of the tax-favored treatment, the
152 See Wooten, supra note 74, at 1311.
153 See Norman P. Stein, Some Lessons From History: The Origins of Pension and
Profit-Sharing Taxation, 1914-1942, 58 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAx'N-EMPLoYEE BENEFITS
AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 12-1, 12-7 to 12-8 (2000).
154 Id. at 12-27.
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commonly cited reason why tax-favored treatment is continued today is
precisely the reason described by Stein: to encourage employers to sponsor
plans. Even though we are concentrating on the employee contribution, the
voluntariness of the payment remains critical to assessing whether it ought
to be deductible under a "forced savings" analytical construct. For
example, in 1981, Congress allowed deductions for voluntary employee
contributions to certain plans in lieu of a contribution to an IRA but denied
deductions "for so-called mandatory employee contributions, i.e., those
required as a condition of employment or in order to participate in the plan
or to obtain the benefit of employer contributions."' 5 5 The voluntariness of
the contribution is thus a crucial ingredient to the current premise
underlying tax-favored treatment for only certain kinds of savings, and not
others, under our income/consumption tax.156 It therefore can be argued-
if this "forced savings" analysis is to be used at all-that the tax
consequences of the employee payment of mandatory employee Social
Security taxes should mirror the tax consequences of disfavored savings,
such as an employee contribution to a nonqualified pension arrangement,
which is typically not deductible by the employee.
15 7
155 Halperin, Cash or Deferred, supra note 150, at 39-21.
156 "[T]he favorable treatment of qualified plans is said to be an incentive for savings.
If so, it would seem to be unnecessary when savings are mandatory." Halperin, Description,
supra note 131, at ix.
157 One contrary response to this might be that there do exist some mandatory qualified
pension plan payments that are deemed to come from the employee, rather than the
employer, that the employee may exclude from his or her income. My own situation
provides a personal example. As an employee of the state of Ohio, a fixed percentage of my
negotiated salary is mandatorily withheld from my paychecks and contributed to the State
Teacher's Retirement Association, a defined benefit retirement plan. The state of Ohio
makes an "employer" contribution as well. Neither the employer contribution nor the
portion withheld from my negotiated salary, i.e., my "employee" portion, is includable in my
gross income for federal income tax purposes. Yet, I have no say in whether or not I wish to
make such a "contribution." One response is that the portion deemed to come from the
"employee" under this scheme is arbitrary. Under reasoning similar to that made by Dean
Griswold, see supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text, the distinction is purely formal.
My formal "salary" could just as easily be designated as the amount net of my "mandatory
contribution," with the entire contribution paid by my employer. For example, assume that
my negotiated salary is $100,000 per year, with $10,000 mandatorily withheld and paid to
the state retirement fund and an additional $10,000 paid to that fund by the state. It is just as
reasonable to characterize this arrangement as one in which my salary is $90,000 with a
$20,000 pension contribution paid by the state. Moreover, "[S]tate and local governments
are allowed, through a mere declaration to that effect, to treat mandatory employee
contributions to their retirement plans as if they were employer contributions." Halperin,
Description, supra note 131, at ix.
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B. The Medicare Tax as Insurance Premium
As stated earlier, I believe the case for linking the Medicare tax to
future medical care to be received is even weaker than is the case for
linking the Social Security tax with the receipt of old-age and survivors
benefits, since there is no correlation between the amount of tax paid and
the benefits received. A reader who once again disagrees with this
contention explicitly conceptualizes the payment of Medicare taxes as the
payment of an insurance premium to cover future medical care. How
would the tax payment and the receipt of medical care be treated under the
income tax under such a conceptualization?
If the payment of the Medicare tax is explicitly viewed as a payment
for medical insurance that will provide care later in life, then the payment
should be treated like any other health-insurance-premium payment for
income tax purposes. That is to say, it would generally be treated as a
personal-consumption expense but would nevertheless be deductible to the
extent that it, combined with other healthcare expenditures for the year,
exceeded 7.5% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income.15 8 The receipt of
medical care in kind later in life would then not be includable, since it
would simply constitute the actual receipt of what was purchased earlier.
The fact that a particular taxpayer may have paid total "premiums" that do
not approach the fair value of the medical care actually received should not
be troublesome, as this happenstance commonly occurs in all fields of
insurance, and the government does not tax such gains under the income
tax.
VII. INTEGRATION IF THE LINK BETWEEN FUTURE BENEFITS AND TAXES
PAID IS REJECTED
Above, I rejected the link between the old-age and survivors portion of
the Social Security tax and the Medicare tax and any future individual• 159
benefits that the taxpayer may receive. I view the payroll taxes as
undifferentiated federal taxes used to support federal spending (for the
currently retired generation). Under that view, the taxes paid and benefits
received by any particular taxpayer ought to be analyzed independently of
each other for income tax purposes. How might the integration analysis
proceed under such a view?
One possibility to consider is whether the payment ought to be
deductible under an income tax for reasons that are quite different from the
158 See I.R.C. § 213.
159 See discussion supra Part V.
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earlier discussion regarding the qualified plan analogy. Another possibility
is whether it ought to be creditable against that tax. In both cases, the
benefits received, severed from any connection with the tax, should also be
analyzed separately under income tax theory. Parts A and B consider the
possibility of a deduction or credit, respectively, for the old-age and
survivor's portion of the Social Security tax, as well as the tax
consequences of the receipt of cash benefits on retirement. Part C considers
the potential tax consequences of the receipt of Medicare services.
A. An Income Tax Deduction for the Severed Social Security Tax
As noted earlier, a pure income tax base is conventionally assumed to
include both personal consumption expenditures and savings outlays. Thus,
expenses (as opposed to capital expenditures) incurred for business or
investment purposes are generally deductible. A mechanical approach to
this analysis might conclude that, since the payment of a tax is not in
pursuance of an income-producing activity, it must be nondeductible
personal consumption. Going back to first principles, however, one could
argue that such an approach is too simplistic.
The principle underlying the choice of income taxation as a tax base is
generally agreed to be the ability-to-pay principle. 16  It is because a tax
base of "income" is thought to best represent one's ability to contribute to
the fisc that it is adopted as the tax base. If that is true, then even certain
personal expenditures ought to be deductible if they sufficiently
compromise ability to pay. Indeed, this view underlies the personal
exemption and standard deduction, which protect a bare subsistence amount
from taxation, though clearly personal consumption. It also explains the
deduction for extraordinary medical expenses (i.e., those in excess of 7.5%
of AGI) 161 and for extraordinary personal casualty losses (i.e., those in
excess of 10% of AGI).
162
In one sense, then, mandatory government extractions of many sorts
ought to qualify for deduction since they represent amounts not available
for contribution to the fisc---even if one chooses to call them "personal
consumption" outlays because they are not directly connected to an income-
producing activity. As noted earlier, it makes no sense to allow deduction
of the income tax itself under the income tax, even though it is a mandatory
extraction, since it would result in a greater administrative burden with no
160 See generally DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 128, at 19-37
(generally describing tax policy tools, including the ability-to-pay fairness norm).
161 See I.R.C. § 213(a).
162 See I.R.C. § 165(c)(3), (h)(2)(A).
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fundamental change in the distribution of the tax burden. That is not true,
however, of other taxes (so long as they are sufficiently nondiscretionary in
nature), such as certain state and local taxes and, notably, Social Security
taxes. While not directly mentioning Social Security taxes, Joseph Dodge
stated:
Taxes... fulfill the requirements of prima facie deductibility.
The fact that a given taxpayer might reap personal benefits from
government having a value equal to the taxes does not negate the
fact that the taxes are nondiscretionary expenses, since the
taxpayer had no control over how the taxes are spent. The benefits
are fortuitous.
163
For this reason, Social Security taxes could defensibly be made deductible
under income tax theory.
Under the view that the income tax consequences of the Social
Security tax ought to be analyzed separately from the receipt of benefits,
the taxation of the benefits themselves should also be analyzed separately.
As a cash payment that is not a "welfare" payment 164 and therefore which
generally represents ability to pay, it should be fully includable when
received under this analysis. The operation of the personal exemption,
standard deduction, and lower marginal rates on low earnings under the
income tax would combine to protect the ability-to-pay value on receipt.
Notice that this combination--deduction of the taxes in the earning
years and inclusion of the payment in the benefit years-is precisely the
same result obtained under a "forced savings" analysis which further
accepts the characterization of this "forced savings" as comparable to tax-
preferred contributions to certain pension plans. As argued earlier, I
believe that both the "forced savings" analysis is itself weak and (even if
the forced savings characterization is accepted) that the analogy of this
forced savings to tax-preferred pension plan contributions is weak.
165
Nevertheless, we end up at the same place!
163 JOSEPH M. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAXES 123 (1989). Most state and local taxes are
deductible under I.R.C. § 164(a). The deduction for sales taxes was repealed in 1986.
While clearly the major impetus for repeal was to raise revenue in the base-broadening effort
that accompanied significant rate reductions (and to reduce the administrative problems
associated with substantiation of sales taxes paid), perhaps sales taxes can be seen as less
"nondiscretionary" than state income or property taxes, since the amount incurred depends
on one's decisions regarding how much of one's income to consume, as opposed to save.
164 Governmental expenditures that constitute general welfare payments are excludable
from gross income. See Rev. Rul. 63-136, 1963-2 C.B. 19.
165 See discussion supra Part VI.A.
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Ultimately, however, I believe that the deduction approach is the
second-best alternative. The main reason why state and local taxes are
deductible, rather than creditable, under the income tax is to prevent states
from raiding the Treasury and completely shifting all tax receipts to state
coffers. 16 6 That worry is not present with the federal payroll taxes, and I
believe a credit for such taxes is conceptually the most defensible approach.
B. An Income Tax Credit for the Severed Social Security Tax
The idea of a credit under the income tax for Social Security taxes is
not new. One of the original purposes of the earned income tax credit
167
was "to provide a wage bonus to low-wage workers in order to offset the
burden of the social security payroll tax,' ' 168 though it has long ago
exceeded those modest beginnings. Moreover, in 2001, Representative
Thomas M. Barrett of Wisconsin introduced a bill that would provide an
individual refundable credit against the income tax of up to $300 ($600 for
joint filers) of payroll taxes. 169 In their proposed cash-flow consumption
tax replacement for the Code, Senators Nunn and Domenici would "allow
both businesses and individuals to offset their consumption tax liability
166 See DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 128, at 323.
Although § 164 allows a deduction for certain state and local taxes .... .the
U.S. government does not allow any tax credit for state income taxes paid.
Otherwise, the states would be able to destroy the federal government by fully
appropriating its main revenue source. For example, if a taxpayer's federal tax
bill is $100, a state could enact a tax schedule that would also create a tax bill of
$100. If the $100 state tax were creditable against the $100 federal tax, not a
dollar would go into the Federal Treasury.
Id.
167 See I.R.C. § 32.
168 Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit on Incentives and
Income Distribution, 12 TAX POL'Y & ECON. 83, 85 (1998); see also S. REP. NO. 94-36, at 11
(1975) (mentioning the same purpose for the earned income tax credit); H.R. REP. No. 103-
111, at 609 (1993) (noting that the expansion of the credit to workers without children was
intended, in part, to reduce the impact of payroll taxes on those with a lower ability to pay).
See generally Dennis J. Ventry, The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The Political
History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 1969-99, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 983 (generally
describing the origin and purpose of the credit).
169 See H.R. 493 Would Allow Credit For Payroll Taxes, TAX NoTES TODAY (Mar. 5,
2001) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2001 TNT 43-101). Feldstein and
Samwick, who support a completely privatized account system, would provide a credit
against the income tax for the portion of wages mandatorily contributed to these accounts
"[b]oth to make the proposal more politically palatable and to discourage other, possibly
dubious enactments by Congress." SHAVIRO, supra note 13, at 131.
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with the Social Security payroll taxes they pay. . ,170 Further, Jonathan
Forman and others recommended that Social Security taxes be made
partially creditable against the income tax.
171
The argument for a credit is that the two taxes ought to be fully and
explicitly integrated simply because they are both taxes on wage income to
support federal expenditures. Collecting federal taxes on labor income
under two separate systems masks the high effective combined tax rate
imposed on the middle and lower classes. The Social Security tax is not
viewed, in this analysis, as simply a forced expenditure of any old sort that
ought to be deductible under income tax theory because it is
nondiscretionary and thus reduces ability to pay, but rather as the payment
of an actual tax on wages, equivalent to the income tax on wages, both of
which raise revenue for federal spending.
Allowing an income tax credit for Social Security taxes paid raises the
additional issue of the extent to which payroll taxes paid in excess of
income tax owed ought to be refundable under this conceptual approach.
The resolution of this issue depends not only on the obvious revenue
constraints of unlimited refundability but also, perhaps, on whether the lack
of any exemption in the payroll tax system is troublesome. Assume, for
example, that the employee portion of the old-age and survivors tax is made
creditable against the income tax up to $1,500, that a waitress earns
$25,000 and pays $200 in income taxes and $1,500 in the employee portion
of the old-age and survivors tax, and that a lawyer earns $200,000 and pays
$40,000 in income taxes and $5,000 in the employee portion of the old-age
and survivors tax. Allowing a dollar-for-dollar credit of these payroll taxes
against income taxes with no refundability feature would eliminate the
waitress's meager income-tax bill but would not truly recognize her
decreased ability to pay taxes, since the payroll tax attaches to the first
dollar of earned income with no exemption. Indeed, all the credit would do
is significantly reduce the lawyer's income tax bill.
Perhaps payroll taxes ought to be refundable in an amount not to
exceed the equivalent of a reasonable personal exemption. For example, in
170 GRAETZ, DECLINE, supra note 16, at 215.
171 See Jonathan Barry Forman, Promoting Fairness in the Social Security Retirement
Program: Partial Integration and a Credit for Dual-Earner Couples, 45 TAX LAW. 915,
955-64 (1992). Implicit in the notion that a credit ought to be allowed only to the dual-
earner couple is the notion that it is legitimate to link the taxes paid to future benefits
received, because the reason he argues for the credit in this instance is the failure to earn any
"return" on the lower-earning spouse's tax payment. Since I see any attempted linkage
between the tax and any personal future benefit as illegitimate, I see no reason to limit the
credit to dual-earner couples. Indeed, so limiting the credit further feeds the notion that
these taxes "earn" a personal return in retirement for the taxpayer.
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my above hypothetical, suppose that payroll taxes were creditable against
the income tax up to $1,500 and that such credit was fully refundable since
it is determined that $1,500 is a reasonable "personal exemption"
equivalent. The waitress would now owe no income tax and would obtain a
$1,300 tax refund. The lawyer's income tax would be reduced by $1,500.
The effect of such a ceiling would mean that the lawyer receives no payroll
tax "personal exemption," since his payroll tax is far less than his income
tax, and thus refundability-where the personal exemption "equivalent"
would kick in-would never come into play.
Whether or not refundable, a credit approach severs the link between
the tax and benefit and thus would also require independent analysis of the
receipt of cash benefits in retirement. As a cash payment that is not a
"welfare" payment and therefore which generally represents ability to pay,
it should be fully includable under this analysis.172 The operation of the
personal exemption, standard deduction, and lower marginal rates on low
earnings under the income tax would combine to protect the ability-to-pay
value on receipt.
C. The Medicare Portion of the Payroll Tax
If the Medicare tax is viewed as an undifferentiated federal tax to
support federal spending, and thus separate from the receipt of any medical
care under the program later in life, then the payment and receipt should
each be analyzed separately. For the same reasons that it would be
defensible to make the Social Security tax either deductible or creditable in
the income tax under such an approach, the Medicare tax might also be
made deductible or creditable. That analysis need not be restated here. The
interesting question here in either case would be how to treat the receipt of
medical care under the program later in life, analyzed separately as an
independent receipt.
Whereas the receipt of cash benefits under the old-age and survivors
program represents resources over which the taxpayer has control and
which can be spent in any fashion-and thus represents taxable ability to
pay-the receipt of personal consumption in kind in this instance arguably
does not and thus should not be taxable.
Under a rigid and mechanical application of the Shanz-Haig-Simons
concept of income, some might argue that personal consumption received
in kind (i.e., for free) ought, as a theoretical matter, to be valued and
included in the tax base in all events, unless a specific exclusion provision
172 See supra Part VII.A.
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can be found in the Code. 17 3 The fact that everyone enjoys free personal
consumption literally every day that goes untaxed, such as the free concert
while waiting for the subway in the morning, is more a matter of
administrative convenience than grand theory.
Another view, however, is that the personal-consumption component
of the Shanz-Haig-Simons concept of income should be interpreted with the
underlying ability-to-pay norm that informs it clearly in mind. The reason
why resources freely spent on personal consumption (above a bare
subsistence amount) are taxed is because they represent resources under the
control of the taxpayer that could fairly be called upon for contribution to
the fisc. Consumption received in kind may or may not be, depending on
the circumstances.
The expression "net increases in wealth plus consumption" is
susceptible to two readings because consumption can either be
purchased or simply received in kind without charge. (An
example of in-kind consumption without charge would be baby-
care products sent to the parents of septuplets by publicity-seeking
manufacturers.) Under one reading, "net increases in wealth plus
consumption" means gross increases in wealth (inflows or receipts
other than consumption received in kind without charge) less gross
decreases in wealth (outflows or outlays including consumption
expenditures) plus consumption (whether purchased through
expenditures or received in kind without charge). This reading,
which probably has the greater number of adherents, normatively
mandates taxing the value of consumption received in kind
without charge. Under the other reading, "net increases in wealth
plus consumption" means gross increases in wealth (other than
consumption received in kind without charge) less decreases in
wealth-other than consumption spending. This second reading
treats "consumption" as only a principle of nonsubtraction (i.e.,
nondeductibility) for purposes of calculating decreases in wealth.
Consumption expenditures are taxed because they are not
deductible (and thus remain in the tax base) but consumption
received in-kind is not considered an increase in wealth. In other
words, the second interpretation of "net increases in wealth plus
consumption" treats taxable consumption as equal to the amount
spent by the taxpayer on consumption and ignores consumption
received in kind. 1
74
173 E.g., I.R.C. §§ 105, 119, 132.
174 DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 128, at 33.
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If the taxation of personal consumption is seen chiefly as a rule of
nondeductibility, then whether the taxation of consumption received in kind
ought to be valued and taxed would turn on whether the receipt can fairly
be viewed as the equivalent to the receipt of cash followed by a free-
spending choice by the taxpayer-a nondeductible outlay. If it can, as
should typically be the case in the employment context and with the
provision of in-kind consumption by closely held corporations to their
owners, then the consumption should be valued and included. The receipt
in kind can fairly be seen in that case as freeing up cash or assets that we
feel comfortable the taxpayer would have otherwise spent himself absent
the free receipt, 175 and the freed-up cash or assets represent ability to pay.
If it cannot be-if the receipt does not fairly represent the receipt of cash
followed by a free-spending choice by the taxpayer-then the receipt
should not be seen as truly representing ability to pay in the sense that
consumption expenditures chosen by the taxpayer represent ability to
pay- If we can not be sure that the taxpayer would have purchased the
consumption himself, we can not be sure that other cash or assets were
freed (and thus available for contribution to the fisc) from having to be
spent on the same consumption. And the receipt-services or quickly
175 Moreover, inclusion of consumption received in kind as wages or dividends (absent
an explicit exclusion provision) is absolutely necessary to protect the survival of the tax. If
wages and dividends were tax-free simply if they were cast in the form of in-kind
consumption, the tax base would evaporate. It would also be economically inefficient to
encourage casting wages and dividends in this form. The class of free in-kind consumption
outside these contexts is likely not large, "which makes exclusion of these benefits less
troublesome than it would be in the compensation or dividend contexts." Id. at 103.
As a matter of textual exegesis, the argument that most in-kind consumption received
outside of the wage and dividend contexts might not be "gross income" would be as follows.
Section 61 specifically lists compensation for services rendered and dividends as items that
are includable, and there is no limitation that such items must be received in cash or in the
form of tangible property to be includable. With respect to consumption received in kind
that cannot be said to be wages or a dividend, the only language under which it could be
taxed would be the catch-all language, "all income from whatever source derived," in the
introductory sentence of section 61, Perhaps there is more room in this ambiguous language
to conclude that in-kind consumption that cannot fairly be said to reflect the equivalent of
the receipt of cash followed by a free-spending choice is not "income" representing
resources under the control of the taxpayer and thus available for contribution to the fisc. Cf.
United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1968) (though using different reasoning,
concluding that a free trip that was provided neither as compensation for services rendered
nor as a dividend, and perhaps could not be fairly characterized as the equivalent of the
receipt of cash followed by a free spending choice, was excludable by Mr. Gotcher, although
includable by Mrs. Gotcher).
176 See DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 128, at 103 (discussing
noncompensatory and nondividend in-kind consumption).
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consumable assets with little or no utility to anyone else in the
marketplace-does not itself represent ability to pay.
Under this view, the free receipt of medical care under the Medicare
program would not be valued and included in the income tax base. It is fair
to generalize that it is unclear whether the taxpayer would be able, absent
the provision of the free care, to purchase the care himself. We can not be
sure that the receipt of free care freed up other assets (thus representing
ability to pay) that otherwise would have been spent on the medical care,
and the medical care itself does not represent ability to pay.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The policy of nondeductibility and noncreditability of payroll taxes
under the income tax, though deliberate in 1935, has continued without
reexamination as the income tax world around the payroll tax has changed
dramatically. Few payroll taxpayers in the 1930s paid income tax, which
was a tax paid only by the wealthy minority of the population. Moreover,
few thought the income tax would ever be paid by the middle and lower
classes.
When the income tax was expanded to reach the middle and lower
classes, however, suddenly the wages of the lower and middle classes were
subject to double taxation at the federal level-once under the payroll tax
and once under the income tax. For many years, this situation was
ameliorated by the fact that both the payroll tax and the income tax rates
imposed on the middle and lower classes were relatively low. With the
dramatic expansion of the payroll taxes in the last several decades,
however, this is no longer true today.
Payroll tax revenue now nearly equals personal income tax revenue,
and this payroll tax burden is borne predominantly by the middle class. The
combined employer and employee payroll tax rate is now more than fifteen
percent, and nearly two-thirds of households pay more in payroll taxes than
they do in income taxes. This is true particularly in low- and middle-class
households-those with incomes of less than $100,000 per year. At the
same time, the wealthiest households are experiencing significant estate and
income tax decreases while also enjoying an ever-growing share of after-tax
national wealth. Even before enactment of the 2001 Act, Mitrusi and
Poterba concluded that the poor and middle classes experienced a tax
increase between 1979 and 1999 because of the increasing take of the
payroll taxes, while the wealthy enjoyed a tax decrease. The magnitude of
these trends was exacerbated with enactment of the 2001 Act. For reasons
of equity, the time has come to begin considering whether the payroll tax
burden ought to be integrated with the income tax burden through either a
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deduction or a credit. I believe that the most conceptually defensible means
to achieve integration would be to allow workers a refundable credit for a
portion of payroll taxes paid against income tax owed in an amount equal to
a reasonable "personal exemption" equivalent. Social Security benefits
would be fully includable under the income tax when received in
retirement, while medical care received in kind would continue to be
excludable.
Having said this, my cynical side thinks it unlikely that any such
proposal could get far in the near future. One reason is that such a plan
would be expensive, and there is no more budget surplus to pay for it. For
this reason, an alternative to integration might be to repeal the Social
Security wage ceiling of $84,900 (just as under the Medicare tax) and slash
the marginal rates as low as possible to retain revenue neutrality, while
maintaining the payment formula (with the wage ceiling) as it is today.
With low marginal rates under both the Social Security and Medicare taxes,
the multiple tax burden on the labor income of the poor and middle classes
should not be as objectionable as it is today. Once the Social Security and
Medicare taxes are seen as true taxes that fund government spending that
helps to support the infrastructure of our regulated capitalist economy, and
not as equivalents to private pension plans or insurance contributions, then
objections to repealing the wage ceiling should be muted. If progressivity
in the tax burden is generally justified, then there is no reason why the
Social Security tax should be predominantly borne by the middle and lower
classes.
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